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CHAIID1AN ELIHU M. HARRIS: The subject of today's joint 
hearing of the Assembly Judiciary and Criminal Justice Committees 
is Appellate Court Efficiency. 
We hope to identify whatever problems may exist in 
appellate court structure, administration and practices and to 
hear proposals for improving appellate court efficiency. 
For a number of reasons, the caseload of California's 
appellate courts has increased dramatically in recent years. We 
are interested in examining programs, such as the prehearing 
settlement conference, which have been instituted to deal with 
the increased caseload as well as other proposals for dealing 
with the problems facing our state's appellate court. 
We will hear today from appellate court justices, civil 
and criminal appellate practitioners and other experts in 
appellate practice. Our first witness is the Honorable David 
Staniforth, Justice of the Court of Appeal for the Fourth 
District. I'd like to introduce the Vice Chairman of the 
Committee, Mr. Imbrecht, as well as Larry Stirling, Assemblyman 
from San Diego and a menilier of the Committee. Other Committee 
members should be coming in as the morning progresses, from the 
Criminal Justice Committee in particular. Justice Staniforth. 
JUSTICE ROBERT OLIVER STANIFORTH: My name is Robert 
Oliver Staniforth and I'm Justice of the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal here lor.ated in San Diego, Division 1. 
I understand we're to discuss the causes and cures for 
appellate r.ourt congestion. I gather that's the nature of the 
hearing. Mr. Chairman, I've always had this problem. I'm sort 
of a soft spoken judge. I can put people in jail very readily 
but it's just as effective softly as in a harsh tone. I feel 
that in attempting to look to the cures and remedies for the 
problem of congestion, you first have to look and see what the 
causes are at least briefly and I think you get some insight into 
what can be done about.it. There's a lot of talk over the state 
about what causes congestion in the trial courts and appellate 
courts. But I'd like to and I have here with me today, Exhibit 
1. It's on the front page of the Los Angeles Times, the San 
Diego County Section, and if you're looking for the cause of 
congestion in the appellate courts, all you have to do is look at 
the population, things that have happened to Southern California 
in the last ten years, from 1970 to 1980. It's right there and 
it indicates that we are just literally being drowned in the 
sense of population growth. This is translated into court needs 
in a most dramatic manner. Let me give you some figures. These 
are dull sort of things but 
in perspective if you're 
congestion. 
When I came 
three appellate justices 
District encompasses all of Southern 
Angeles County and to the , as well as 
encompass Inyo County. We then had three appellate j 
this District Court of Appeals, as was then called. 
that time a total of 18 trial judges in all of the s 
which are encompassed within the Fourth Appellate Di 
that was in 1946. Three appellate judges, 16 
judges. Today, 1981, we the Fourth 
ten justices of the Court of Five 
the second district. We have a total of 122 
judges in these six counties now. So that means 
each appellate judge there were six superior courts 
and making business for us, if that's what they do 
have 12.2 superior court j s per appel court 
district. This is productive of business. If you 
matter of lawyers, in San D County, in 1946, 
some members of the county bar association. In the f 
came to be an appellate court justice, I swore 28 
in San Diego County. This is done twice a year, 
close to 300 lawyers. There are today more than 
practicing and the ratio of lawyers to judges 
judges has just increased in the same ratio that 
superior court judges and appellate court judges. 
population in this district tells you what has 
not just population, it's the nature of population 
increased our filings. We have had this enormous 
people coming in -- old people --we've had a le 
different ethnic groups which have come into 
into San Diego, Imperial, Orange County, and 
an enormous increase the productivity of 
cases. This is a fact just can't get 
we are associated so close to the border. 
production place for var 
activities. This means bus ss 
courts and the Fourth str 
looking for causes, great and small, 
business of the courts, all you have to do is just 
happened to us in the last 20 years and vou've 
Well, among the lesser causes for this are 
to say you have done to us also things we 
ourselves, the judiciary has done to 
Legislature in its wisdom pas the 
it just produced an enormous amount of 
courts and appellate courts. I'm not 
wisdom of it. 
When you put ef 
flurry of trying to find out exact 
enforced and I don't know 
response to this whole 
There was a flurry of ca 
time there are sub 
find that there is a respon 
a 
sense, you do it to us. 
that causes business. 
negligence has been on 
political issue and I can s not want 
to get involved in such a 
problem legislatively, 
as a matter of a judie 
productive of trial and 
states have resolved the 
Court f lly took on 
enormous 
If you wou 
kind enough to take off iate But 
the political exposure f that sort is 
enormous and I don't blame you at all. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS How we you off 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: If you as some of 
the East have done, to take this on legislatively 
have the Supreme Court to There is not 
question of contributory but I 
have defined at least 30 some or more subs 
remain yet to be resolved in this area. And to 
resolve them by judicial case, case by case. some 
jurisdiction, I believe 's , has 
it as a legislative task. But 's enormous 
problems involved and that's you have some 
people who have differing about this question of 
and assignment of responsibili for negligence Well, 
other words, we, the courts on occas create our 
by-- it's a species of judie l activism and it's 
I don't think we real wou pre - at least I 
feel that it we can avoid 1 activism, 
take on the brunt of the 
I'm totally in favor , but when 's 
courts just straight where you to make a decis 
do it and so it's by this process that we come 
where we are sort of s a sea of paces, 
Fourth Appellate District. Here I a second 
that's the report from Council of July 
perhaps someone from the Council a 
case of this is the last one I have 
and dispositions, which would 
have a fair backlog. The Fourth 
backlog of cases. 
Within my own 
now for assignment for 
for most 
does not have a 
s , we are for cases 
As soon as a case 1s for 
And 
remedies 's 
chairperson of 
the State is one 
f 
they 
The Chief Jus 
for each just 
nine. And she 
fortunately, I 
she assigned f 
Fourth Di 
two re 
our presiding 
from what 
eight cases 
author. I 
has been used 
success as I hope 
use them. It's 
differently but 
one or two months 
at the Supreme Court 
take the very 
the intermediate 
business of writing 
it's an ineff 
expect to 
is going 
reasoning 
then assign it to a lawyer, one of your research to 
and research out the dark ends and go see that your premises are 
correct, to go through the trench. These are just techniques 
which do I think expedite. In this fashion, you can I 
think a great deal more than just simply ass 
expecting some month in the future to hear from 
that it 
shared? 
justices 
ASSEMBLYMAN CHARLES IMBRECHT: 
would be useful for those kinds 
Should you have an opportunity 
within your district? 
Mr. Just , do you 
of techniques to be 
to work with other 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: I think it would be enormous 
helpful and it is done at our seminars. We do discuss 
technique of opinion writing and we do discuss s 
use of the staff, of our elbow clerks, but the thing is a 
aren't angels. Each has a different quantity to contribute 
I'm not saying at all that the writing of the lengthy full 
scholarly type almost Supreme Court type opinion isn't proper. I 
like to do it myself and I'm accused of doing it so~etimes I 
think as an Appellate Court justice we have a more specif j 
We aim at a specific problem. We should get in and get out. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Let me try to rephrase that. I 
guess I was trying to lead the witness in a sense but I 
concern about static divisions within districts where c 
have some divisions that are not even minimally approaching the 
productivity of other divisions elsewhere in the State and I have 
some concern about leaving those divisions intact in e 
perpetuity until there is a change in a clear professional sense 
of one of those justices. I wonder if you could comment. I've 
heard some legislation in this area in terms of providing a 
periodic, infrequent rotation if you will or change in the 
membership of divisions within a given district. 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: I think that a sort of cro s 
pollination is extremely important. I keep urging it a on a 
daily basis. For example, we have been assigned these 50 case 
out of another district in the First District. We are 
them. I have worked on seven of them thus far the 
we received them. I feel that it would he much more he 
to have the people, the lawyers who are going to argue these 
cases, to come to San Diego. If we could go up and sit for a 
or two or three and work with the people in the San Francisco 
courts so that we could see their techniques and they could see 
ours. I have discussed this with one of the presiding just 
in the First District and he's most anxious to come down and 
just how the San Diego technique works. There are all sorts 
techniques for expediting that we have. For example, when I came 
on the court five years ago, we had what was called a wall. s 
was a wall that had over 300 cases that were there waiting to be 
tried, waiting to be heard, but we had no judges to hear 
cases. We had not had an appointment to the court for more than 
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a year so when I got 
through with our ass 
went to six and when 
wall. We've got to get 
to, after you've 
go the wall and 
out of the wall. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Our concern, at 
I certainly will not attempt to 
reality. Some of it is seal. 
be able to simply respond to 
more justices. We went a 
the number that we did and there 
reticence if you 11, 
judgeships. These cost untold 
in terms of staff and other attendant costs 
that what we're really going to have to 
very specific recommendations as to how we 
scope of appellate review or 
review of those matters 
arguments at best, that is 
the question of automatic 
we should constrain to some extent, 
becoming more professional making 
becoming a li~tle better at what they're 
we do to maintain the structure, the 
justices, we now have 84, 
legislation. I don't 
that, even if your caseload 
opinion. Do you have any comment 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: Wel , it was 
hard place. The Judicial Council has these 
many people/population another 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
understand the legislative 
caseload is going to 
some very hard decisions 
willing to make to this 
recommendations the v1ay 
speak. We'd like to do 
where you've got to 
would rather do the fol 
That's what I'm real 
you might recommend even 
say it's not a good way 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: 
not appropriate, the matter of 
a single appeal is just 
only constitutional 
chopping a person off. It's a problem of due process. 
does due process mean? This is a real hard problem. I 
some questions in my own mind about the cutting total 
the right to appeal on a person. I have constitutional 
about any such approach to the resolution of the 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I share those concerns. 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: Secondly, it's basically not 
That's the problem. A person has the need to perhaps to 
least one thing. I agree that beyond that it isn't neces 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But I'm saying that it seems to 
that there ought to be the possibility of a cursory 
fact there are no material errors, if in fact 
basis •.• 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: We do that right now. We 
under the present law and that's perhaps one of the 
the Fourth District. You look at the statistics on the 
what we term "by the court opinions." I think the figures 
indicate we are one of the worst offenders or the best, 
you look at it, in the whole State in the use of "by 
These are staff prepared. These are theoretically 1 
cases in which there are no great judgmental factors involved, 
things which generally result in affirmance of a 1 
decision. If that's so, and it's controlled by precedent, that 
no change in precedent to control it. 
These are ones which can be prepared by staff, 
use it, but there's a negative aspect to that type of 
and that is that the Bar and the litigants generally don' 
it quite as well as they like it where a judge will sign on. 
They don't like this "faceless decision", as they are 
And I can see why. If I were a litigant and I had a 
matter, I'd like to know there's three judicial minds. 
do our best. I think the "BC" approach is excel and 
responds directly to the questions you have. We shou 
of them that way. We have another problem and that is 
is a constitutional requirement that we set forth 
But the question is how lengthy must you be? I know 
apparently got too short in one of them here recent 
the Third District and it got sent back because 
didn't fulfill the constitutional requirements. 
But we do have to say a few words over 
with you that we don't have to write lengthy opin s on 
the cases in order to dispose of them. This is one of 
secrets of the Fourth District in becoming current. 
another area which you can help us is in this matter of 
of staff. I don't know about increased use of the 
staff, but I can see enormous possibilities in making 
two lawyers I have just, well, we jumped from six to 
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first of a , 
a distance for a 
you. The 
Chairman and 
Planning Board here 
all the institutions 
one that did not have 
analytical ana is 
Obviously the prob 
from the 
otherwise 
scrutiny 
regard. 
I'm 
there is indeed 
element other 
justice or the 
element -- do 
automated, have 
your caseload? 
colleagues s 
the public 
judicial 
we have 
processors and 
can produce, or 
was able to 
ASSEMBLYMAN 
other Elreas 
just write and 
pages every t 
that 
We have 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: Each of the distr s 
are going in our library to the microfiche type of 
centralization of library and data retrieval. We are 
the 20th Century in this process. The Judicial Council 
us fairly carefully and periodically they do 
professional groups to come in study us. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But there is not 
institutionalized any internal mechanism such as, for 
the city or the state has. We have the Legislative Ana 
we have the annual budgetary process where there is competition 
for resources and theoretically if you've got good management 
good leadership, some reform and efficiency mechanisms mus 
faced. In the case of the judiciary, though, you s 
the tab and if we don't like it, tell us to go to hell, 
we've got to pay it anyway. 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: No, we've never said 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: No, of course not. I 
you're telling me that there is indeed not institutiona 
within judiciary some rrucial heartrending annual ..• 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: The question should 
Judicial Council. I am so busy grinding my nose on cases 
rolling them out that I expect that the Judie 1 
such a function. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: You suspect it? 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: I'm on the front 1 
trenches and I just don't have time to see what they 
that level. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: What percentage of your 
workload would you characterize as indigent criminal 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: I would suspect about half. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: About half. I vlOU 
interested if you have any thoughts about, one of 
I've got •.. and I've certainly want to assure you and 
listening that I very much believe in affording full 
opportunities and protection of the law to every citizen. 
have some concern, though, that there is at least some 
disincentive to pursue an appeal that has a very, , 
likelihood of success, that that doesn't really st where 
indigent dependent who has been convicted, but continues 
full public resources at his disposal, to pursue an appea 
if there are no merits for such an effort. And I think 
problem that we somehow have got to try to address. And 
me 50 percent of your total workload stems from that 
certainly cannot represent 50 percent of the total 
wouldn't think. 
-9-
we 
sent any 
flurrv of ef 
have a for 
of appeal. 
on -- you're 
st 
ASSEMBLY~1AN 
reporters. 
are wa 
transcr 
be dead 
now, avai 
available 
used in 
here in our 
process. 
we haven' 
their br f . 
we get the 
b he 
can't 
safe. I 
would 
of video 
of the whole 
level of 
would exped 
to ze your 
appreciate it. We 
JUSTICE 
expediting o 
giving us the tools 
that, we can do it 
feeling, and a lot 
you have to have more 
I had all sorts of 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS 
to us, and we will keep the 
recommendations that 
an extension of your 
my 
would 1 
the increased iustice 
create more ju ces 
poor people; I've 
so and so forth; is 
we are going to be 
appreciate your expe 
that we 
we need 
Yes. Mr. 
to 
does a 
simply depend on the 
individual justices? 
JUSTICE 
head. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STI 
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: 
fellow legislators. Everyone 
production. I don't 
differently. Thank 
CHAIRMAN HARRI 
from the Judicial Council, 
I'd like Mr. Gampell to 
MR. RALPH GAMPELL: 
or do ... 
CHAIRHAN HARRIS 
Staniforth our concerns 
recommendations. We 
special committee on 
First Appellate Distr 
HR. Gll.J;1PELL: 
applicable to all the j 
Let me just 
question to Justice 
centralized budgeting 
budgeting for next 
through the Judicial 
and hauling and one 
the Legislature on 
appellate system of 
that 
budget 
December 
Analyst 
MR. GAMPELL 
HR. GAMPELL: 
to 
different 
Mr. 
certa 
Finance and their management experts have any input in 
budget process. 
MR. GAMPELL: Well, I know the budget people of our 
staff are in constant 
Department of Finance. 
they do-- the amount ... 
with the budget people 
I don't know the extent to which 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: The reason I ask that as s 
as a member of the Subcommittee on Ways and Means that has 
budget, as you hold the Judicial Council's budget, constant we 
hear your representatives saying, "Well we can absorb this cost, 
we can absorb that cost", if it happens to philosophically 
with the Chief or you. But yet, there are other costs, 
"no, no, there is no way we can absorb that", which tell 
there is some fat in that budget and I'm not sure that 
getting the proper scrutiny ... 
MR. GAHPELL: I think, Assemblyman Robinson, it is not 
that it is fat, but it has to be heavy budgeting against 
contingencies that nobody can predict. Such as budgeting 
assigned judges; those judicial vacancies that are not 
that we have to fund and nobody knows as the year goes 
that fund is going to be. So it is appropriated and if 
used, it's turned back. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Did the Governor's recent 
executive order of two percent cutback affect your budget 
MR. GAMPELL: \'le propose to go along with that, 
think our situation is the same as the Legislature's. We 
separate branch of government; we are going to go along 
But the executive order to the executive branch obviously 
affect the courts any more than it does the Legislature. 
do propose to turn back two percent. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, if you turn back 
percent and with the new iustices that were created in 
Harris' hill, you are going to have some diffirulty if 
all appointed. 
MR. GAMPELL: We are going to have a great deal 
difficulty. If I could go back again to a question 
Stirling's, and that is about the modern age. Yes, it's 
brought on line, there is statewide data processingJ 
the whole appellate system; that has been obtained and 
bits of the program are being put in. And that was 
through the administrative office. F.very justice of the 
appellate system has a word processor and appropriate 
have made an attempt in the last two years to bring the 
system up, at least mechanically, into the 20th Century. 
-13-
and 
and 
State of 
We had a 
or another. 
research and 
provider, it may have 
to simply develop 
had been 
HR. GAMPELL: 
the mechanical technique 
there are only two data ba 
a much bigger data 
the state, the 
it in no way 
would want. 
you tied 
MR. GAMPELL: 
judie 
access charges to them 
which we could hE!ve 
attorneys and 
that we do. 
in the 
increments, 
receptivity 
didn't want to get 
things, we didn't 
lease terms, I 
state public de 
indeed, so ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN 
stage? 
MR. GAMPELL: 
the exper 
MR. GAMPELL: Well, we've only had it in for six 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That goes back to the original 
question I asked you. You answered by saying, "Well, there is 
statewide budgeting now." But the excruciating, agonizing 
reappraisal each year of all of our techniques, I hear you 
saying, as I expected you to say, that you were doing a 
good job, there, and we are always looking for better, and 
fine. But as the years pass, and if we are more concerned about 
how a bunch of nice old judges are going to react to the reforms, 
rather than the excruciating pain of the Legislature or the city 
councils, or supervisors are going through, the exigency should 
control and not the comfort of the judges. 
MR. GAMPELL: In the years when this state was fat, 
Judicial Council of the past wasn't doing it, statewide data 
processing, I've only got in within the last two years. When 
things were timed, and automated legal research which has been 
around for a bunch of years, I've got one in in the last six or 
nine months. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, I congratulate you for 
that, and, again, it brings up my point. Under the existing 
system that you have, it really depends on the initiative of an 
individual. Of the leadership of an individual, either the 
Justice, yourself, or Justice Staniforth, or someone like that. 
As opposed to an institutional relationship where there is an 
annual reevaluation of that with some political -- judicial 
political blessing -- the terms are now reform and improvement 
technologically and don't give me all this nonsense about your 
comfort zone and you only want to do two cases a year, ... 
MR. GAMPELL: There's another flip ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Does the Judicial Council have any 
control or any role in all of this? 
MR. GA}1PELL: The Judicial Council? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
~1R. GAMPELL: A role in what I've just been saying? 
mustn't be forgotten that every appellate judge is an 
independently elected public official, just as a member of 
Legislature. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Independently elected is 
stretching the terms, Mr. Gampell, you are a very good lawyer 
and know they are not elected, they are confirmed. They are 
confirmed by the people, they are not elected. 
MR. GAMPELL: I say the language -- shall so and so be 
elected ... 
-15-
ASSEMBLYMAN 
excel 
Governor. 
an opponent 
removed by the 
still 
think you are 
tough to get 
~1R. GAMPELL 
judicial sy 
reform. 
MR. GAMPELL 
kind of thing you were 
spread? This f 
presiding justices 
of collegial 
or three 
appellate inst 
run by the judie 
if Judge X of a court 
examp One 
we have 
is, we _,_ , 
sions of 
requests 
by the same 
whereby there 
process 
conform, some 
penali?ed. 
MR. GAMPELL 
concerned, budgeting 
that X ls 
committees and is 
is something over 
as far as 
to operate in a certain 
persuasion. There is no 
, all it can 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON 
example. Existing law, I bel 
judge who sits on his 
is 
within an appropr , s sa 
He certifies at the time his sa 
of carrot and stick approach can be expanded to 
things as automation to be an encouragement to be a 
less loquacious and more e There are all 
that could be expanded, within the canst 
limits. 
MR. GAMPELL: 
this state at any level t.em is 
the Chief Justice sitting at 
below this, this level below 
think, all I can give you is 
in California. I think ... 
of a pyramid, 
that, and this level be 
an example of why that wou 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Let me give you an 
Doesn't the Chief Justice have the ability or the 
have the ability to stop publication of 
coming out of various DCA divisions and ... 
MR. GAMPELL: Through de-publication, yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Is that exerci 
MR. GAMPELL: I th 
would like. 
ASSEMBL Yr-1AN 
more than the 
But maybe that 
peer pressure use. s my experience 
very 
1 at 
justices render a great deal more decisions, whether 
upheld on appeal or not, that wou have to be wa 
begin to render more decis s a more effective 
more reasonable time limits than other justices who have 
50 pages of dialogue simp render a two 
decision. Now if the Chief to exercise 
constitutional and statutory ability to not publish some 
stuff, ... 
MR. GA1'1PELL: That has to be a court decis 
ASSEMBLY~1AN ROBINSON: If the court dec 
that then, there would he less for an 
justice to think that he is rewriting the entire 
statutes of this world at he is rendering a 
which would encourage him to be more efficient. 
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MR. GAMPELL: 
lood in the streets 
same 
l\1R. GAMPELL 
institutional capacitv 
wondered why there was 
maybe a couple of 
sions. 
productivity of the var 
variety of other, I , 
occasional mixture -- not so 
destroy continuity and a 1 
perhaps annually or 
MR. GAMPELL: 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: 
great dea o sense. 
whether or not people 
with a very low productivity 
accepted peer c 
I must stress 
thought, not inst 
place and you pick 
I don't like the 
don't know how you would 
to talk to you about 
about Jones versus Cl 
every couple of 
you had 
appellate 
tolerated 
sions 
practice. 
of rules practice 
is much worse that 
fferent rules of 
been allowed to 
ss, 
is 
re is a 
comfortab 
the d 
We do not have a monolithic, hierarchical court 
in California and that means a group of judges are 
on their business the way they believe to be the most 
expeditious. It may not be the way their colleagues 
hall think is most expedit s 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me interrupt you. We want 
along. I want to ask this: We would like the Judie 
to come up with some specific recommendations. 
is some way we ought to be able to force that, because 
think you are going to come back with some recommendat s 
to get a little better accountability whether it is a carrot 
approach or a stick approach as it relates to the inconsi 
among the so-called independently elected officials, e 
come in with a new review process which I think is f 
to have the Judicial Performance Commission periodical 
all the justices and get some type of obiective standard 
it is not used for anything other than to see whether or 
are in fact performing reasonably well in terms of the 
opinions. If they are appellate justices, how many of 
opinions have been reversed at the Supreme Court? To 
really whether or not they are doing the job they have 
selected to do. Because, you know, where as we do not 
appointment for life, it damn near comes down to 
MR. GAMPELL: To show the enormitv of task 
state, we've been fooling around, now, for what, 15 or 2 
on a much simpler process. Should we unify the superior 
courts? Now that is a very simple up or down ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Don't mention that. Mr. 
might go ... 
MR. GAMPELL: I mean, that's a simple question. And you 
get any kind of consensus. And what you're asking, is 
some way, without power, proceed to take over the 1 
court. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: ~ve have some power, within 
constitutional limits, to do And what I'm suggest 
this: If our staff collectively comes up wi.th a list o 
we would like the Judicial Council to answer in terms of 
possibilities are, the problems that might exist with 
rule making, for example, so that we have some kind of con 
process of rules. What are the limits? What flexibil 
we allow while still having something consistent. What 
for example, in the report of the Chief Justice's 
the First Appellate District, there were a number 
recommendations. Maybe vve ought to have one judge who 
the responsibility for passing on recommendations to 
appellate court as to which appeals seem to be frivolous, 
a pre-screening thing. Maybe we ought to look into those 
things. We could come up with a list of those of 
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CHAIRMAN 
will 
caught up 
your staff or 
able to control 
MR. GAMPELL: 
you is that we will do 
in from this 
very edgy 
time. But it 
this 
will take 
operating 
together will 
'VJill be with or 
cal. 
arguing that. But 
and I'm not going 
judgeships as be 
got economic 1 
ing the so 
putting a 
some parts of 
working well 
want to 
emulated 
positive 
branches 
Chairman. 
advantage 
saving 
that be 
s 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why don't you get to the mike, so 
the record reflects your answers. 
MR. GAMPELL: Right after 13, there was a proposal 
the judicial council brought up again for state funding. 
of a tremendous ground swell on the judiciary, statewide, 
was couched in terms of state funding with local control. 
not sure I know what that means, but it was quite clear 
didn't mean that it was to be centralized control. Now, there 
nothing in the Constitution which would allow for centralized 
control. The Chief Justice has said that she certainly doesn 
look to it, doesn't want it. The idea -- the Judicial Counci 
the administrative office has to be responsible for how they 
a court, in the East Los Angeles muni -- it would entail a 
bureaucracy. It would entail some constitutional changes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay. Well, let's take 
elected judges out and just talk about the appellate system 
how that's revamped to make it more economically sound, 
it's uniform standards of practice like the federal circuit 
have, or from that to changing the whole makeup of the j 
council so it's given more authority and it can be held more 
budgetary test by this Legislature who has, notwithstanding 
recent decision of the state Supreme Court, the sole author 
appropriate funds. 
MR. GAMPELL: You don't want me to comment on that, 
you. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I'm not asking you to; 
editorializing. 
HR. GAMPELL: You're telling me ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I'm just alerting you that 
is some feeling in the Legislature that maybe that if the 
is going to award some of these outrageous legal fees without 
benefit of statutory authorization and what not, that it 
come out of their own budget, so that at least they are tak 
the money out of their own wallets when they give it away 
regard to the state's fiscal problems. 
MR. GAMPELL: You still don't want me to comment, 
you? 
ASSEMBLYMAN U1BRECHT: Right. What do you cons 
unconstitutional, or what do vou consider would be edgy on a 
constitutional ... 
MR. GAMPELL: I think any attempt to impose on appel 
judges the way in which they are to carry out their elected 
tasks, would be edgy ... 
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ASSEHBLYMAN ROBINSON: 
elected ..• 
MR. GAMPELL: 
could, Assemblyman, is 
down from the committee, 
and the Judicial Council 
reflective thought and 
with a hypothetical •.• 
You insist on us 
the best way I cou 
If specif 
hopeful that 
answer. 
ASSm1BLYMAN ROBINSON: We are not arguing 
that a certain amount of power rests with this 
through this committee, the Legislature, to modi 
make more efficient, the appellate process with 
are not constitutionally from doing so. 
one interpretation of your original statement and 
keep -- I'm not trying to pressure you, Ralph, I l 
believe it or not, you are fun to argue with. 
MR. GAHPELL: You are making my original 
have to be aware of our tripartite system of 
judicial branch is the third branch. Now, I know 
the power of the purse, but equally well, it is a 
government. And each one s to be solicitous of 
the others. And that's not meant to be a cop-out. 
branch is a separate branch of government. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Mr. Davies, 
to add anything? 
MR. JOHN W. DAVIES: In response to 
regarding the balance between c 1 appeals and 
in years 1979 and '80, figures show that there were 
appeals and 4,586 criminal s about 50-50. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: And are 50 percent of 
appeals in the indigent 
MR. DAVIES: Yes, 
and I believe that's correct. 
years, about a seven percent 
percent annual increase on 
annual increase, and that, 
t.o uhat' s been happening at 
Circuit. They've had a 6 
enough, in '79-'80, the ump 
side and only 7.2 percent on 
growing at the same rate, and 
ASSEMBLY~~N ROBINSON: 
Council have? 
MR. GAMPELL: I'm 
? 
was the response 
s represents, 
se on both s 
the civil and 
stingly enough, 
1 level 
increase. 
was 16 
criminal s 
that case, 
How much staff 
to have to 
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fer 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Just 
one hundred •.. 
MR. GAMPELL: In terms o 
luded? In terms of analysts, we 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What's 
centralized staff, how 
MR. GAMPELL: Just about s 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Sixty? 
MR. GAMPELL: Yes. But that 
stic1ans who do statistics for the 
ASSE.HBLYMAN ROBINSON: Hell 
I'm looking at. If the Legislature 
the Chief Justice a separate inst 
or Judicial Analysts Office, 
and tasks them specifically with annua 
strative efficiency of the 
slature on efficiency measures 
adopted, is that something that would 
r staff to do? 
MR. GAMPELL: You're looking .. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Say ye . 
MR. GM1PELL: If you're ta 
something like that, that is ab 
Analyst has only taken it on for 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: 
the source justice doesn't 
ion reports and ship it up 
MR. GAMPELL: No, it isn' 
example; if you institute 
Everybody asked why 
ion to Assemblywoman Moorhe? 
penalty? And the answer is 
We believe that it will cause 
1 be a need for more judges than 
The money for those additional j 
, that's a very simple cons 
s implications. So, judie 
not an easy thing to do. But 
in any which way we can; 
know me, know I run a tight 
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numbers. Five, 
I'd say, six to 
Gampell? 
your 
s budget people, 
of the system ... 
's the kind of people 
an institution or 
called the Judicial 
ing to that effect, 
ing the 
reporting to the 
been proposed and 
sically feasible for 
about judicial impacts, 
an horrendous problem 
~month study, ... 
problem 
management 
, I'm afraid. Take 
let me give you the 
Council was in 
on the new drunk 
opposed for a narrow 
j trials, there 
s warranted in the 
s wasn't in the bill. 
but others, have 
an easy thing to 
answer is, we will 
, and I think those of 
at if we need more 
help, we are going to get Because I could double the size of 
my statistics unit; I could treble the size of a thing called the 
court management unit that goes into trial courts to assist them 
in their non-j ial side ... 
ASSEHBLYMAN STIRLING: Will that ultimately save us 
money? 
MR. GAMPELL: The answer is ves. I think it would, 
particularly in court management. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I think it needs to be done. The 
thing that I am struggling with is that internally you are 
running the good 'ole boys club, and eventually, the good 'ole 
girls club probably, as opposed to having institutionally a Leg 
Analyst role directly under the Chief Justice, who says, "By God, 
you guys aren't producing," or, "You ladies aren't producing." 
MR. GAMPELL: And then what do you do? 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Then you take corrective action. 
If you need legislative help to do that, then we will give it to 
you. 
MR. GAMPELL: That's the critical thing. ~ve 
demonstrate, we put out the figures per year as to what the 
various courts are doing. It's the next stage. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: By and large, as I've heard your 
testimony, and your staff's testimony, in Sacramento, has been we 
have problems with our productivity and I say, "Why don't you can 
some of the judges," and they say, "We don't do that sort of 
thing." The whole argument against the judges retirement, 
letting the old boys hang on for awhile was that if they were 
over a certain age, they are obviously incompetent, and the other 
side if they are over a n age, they are better like wine, 
as opposed to evaluating irrespect of age or sex, based on 
their product ty. You simply don't want to do that. As an 
institution, don't want to do that. And that's bad. You let 
everybody hang on, 's like moss under a rock. And unless you 
let the sunshine , it's just going to continue to be moss. 
MR. GA11PELL: I don't want to take the time of the 
Committee. ve raised a very interesting problem and one very 
difficult to to be fair. Let me give you a for instance: 
Do it in a tr 1 court. You publish the figures that Judge 
Cramer has on two jury trials in three years. What's the 
guy doing? The answer is that he has been on law and motion. 
He's not seen a jury case, but there is no way you can explain 
that. Or, this judge, Judge Stirling, has not done any cases, 
not at all. The reason being, he's the settlement guy, and he 
only settles cases. It's those kind of productivity figures 
which can be so deceiving, or an appellate justice who's really 
had some very tough cases ... 
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That's really, as the Chairman, I 
think is about to say, you can develop reflective data. I mean, 
we evaluate baseball teams and football teams on all sorts of 
things that the public now understands and I still don't know 
what an earned run average is. But the public understands and 
evaluates professional athletes that way. We don't even evaluate 
our cops, as something that is so important, and we sure as hell 
don't evaluate our judges and you talk about the constitutional 
limitations, let the public decide. Simply publish those 
evaluations in a fair manner, and I assume you have competent 
staff that could get over those hurdles and reflect things in a 
fair manner and let the profession decide. Let the Bar 
Association and let the public decide. Let the sun shine in. 
MR. GAMPELL: I think it would be an interesting topic, 
though I'm not sure it's one that's capable of any easy analysis, 
how you determine what productivity is. 
ASSEMBLYHAN STIRLING: The message that you ought to 
take back to the Chief, and to the Council, is that at no time 
has the judiciary been held in such low esteem by the people, and 
believe me, that's reflected in the Legislature. You look at the 
number of constitutional amendments that were carried just this 
year, to restructure the confirmation process, to restructure the 
entire process for obvious political motivations, but at the same 
time, the reason there was a political motivation for an 
individual to carry a bill that drastically rewrites the way we 
handle our appellate courts in the state, was because the public 
was eating it, and loving it. Because they are very frustrated 
with the system as we currently see it operate. I mean, you just 
can't constantly bury your head in the sand and say, "Well, you 
know, we are indepenrlently elected and we will do what we damn 
well please, irrespective of budget constraints, irrespective of 
the people's will." 
MR. GAMPELL: I'd like to answer you in two halves. As 
far as substantive law, which is part of the big push, it would 
be totally improper for me to discuss whether we are ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: No, no. I'm pointing to that as 
evidence, that you are in deep ~anure, if you will, in this 
Legislature, which means you're in pretty deep with the people. 
Look, because there are all kinds of formats whether we ~re going 
to confirm them in different process, whether we are going to 
have joint house confirmat , or whether or maybe another 
outrageous example, instead of having the people every twelve 
years, why don't we bring the justices back to the Legislature 
for reconfirmation everv twelve years before they go back on the 
ballot. 
MR. GAMPELL: That would even politicize the process 
even more, wouldn't it? 
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CHAI~~N HARRIS: No joke. 
that's a possibil1ty, Mr. Gampell. 
lightly because people are talking. 
He's simply saying that 
He's saying, don't take it 
MR. GAMPELL: Yes, I recognize that. But vour baseline 
question is how could we increase productivity? We are 
constantly inundated with proposals. One ex-justice was parading 
the halls in the last days of this last Legislature. You don't 
need 105, you can get out 200. I think my answer is, you can get 
out 300, if you don't want to read the briefs. It depends what 
you regard as a basic element of procedural and substantive •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: That is true. If you don't rP-ad 
the briefs you can do 300, but you have to admit that there are 
lUstices that only put out 20 to 30 opinions and they are not 
very complicated cases. They are cases where either the justice 
has fallen in love with the case, and he writes 50 pages as the 
example I used earJier, or there are cases where the justice is 
just flat lazy. Those people exist, too. You are no different, 
that collection of people is no different than this Legislature. 
Some of our colleaoues are less productive than others, or than 
any other aspect of public or private service in this county. 
But, you sit on your pedestal saying we have a perfect system and 
don't tamper with it because the Constitution impairs you from 
that. 
MR. GAMPELL: I didn't say that. I said that the 
hierarchical system does not exist in California which would 
allow tampering froM above, to use your word. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Our next witness is the 
Honorable Winslow Christian, Justice of the Court of Appeal for 
the First District. Justice Christian, welcome. 
JUSTICE WINSLOW CHRISTIAN: Thank you. I've been 
observing and participating in the appellate scene and in the 
legislative attention to appellate problems for a good many 
years, now, and this hearing today is the first instance that I 
recall of a body of legislators starting to look at the overall 
institutional problems of our appellate system in any coherent 
way. And I think that the state that we are in nov7, the very 
difficult state that the appellate system is in at present, 
reflects the fact that there has never been a comprehensive 
reevaluation in recent years of what we are doing in these 
courts. 
I listened carefully to what Justice Staniforth had to 
say and agreed wholeheartedly with everything he said on the 
policy side of this with one exception having to do with the 
court reporter problem and if there are questions about that 
later on, I'll be happy to respond. But I don't see that as one 
of the central issues, and I'll just pass that by and base my 
remarks, if I may, on the platform of what Justice Staniforth and 
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Mr. Gampell have said and bring vou perhaps some additional 
perspective and some very specific proposals as to things that 
can be done with this caseload problem that we havA. 
First, the difference in perspective. The American 
legal system is, I suppose, the second cousin now of the legal 
system of present day Britain and the relationships are still 
close enough so that comparisons have some validity. It's 
striking to me that the United Kingdom, England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, with the population of approximately twice 
that of California, has at the present day, seven, that is seven, 
not 70, Lord Justices of Appeal. Those seven judges, with the 
participation of a good many trial judges on assignment in 
handling the criminal side of the court's business, perform the 
function of an intermediate appellate court, which in California 
occupies the time of ten times as many judges. Seventy judges do 
the same work here. 
Of course, there are differences. Our societies are 
different, the expectations of the people are different, our 
people are more litigious, but I think it does bring a 
perspective to this problem to see that over the years, the 
willingness of the Legislature to add judicial positions has 
given us, at the present day, by far the largest appellate 
judiciary of any state in the United States. We just added 18 
more, or are about to add 18 more under legislation just passed. 
But I'd like to assure the members of the Committee that unless 
really fundamental efforts are made to change the structure of 
our system, and to effect the way cases come to us, that the 
state will soon be asking for an appellate judiciary exceeding 
100 in order to keep track of the intake of these cases. The 
situation has sotten so bad that the backlog in some of the 
Districts, and here I'll tell you what's happening in the First 
District where I work, the intake of criminal appeals has 
continued gradually each year to creep up. Those appeals are of 
course by statute entitled to priority, and that's a priority 
that I think is sound. It should not be changed. But the ef 
of this gradual increase has been to crowd the c 1 appeals off 
of our calendar so that when the court got tosether some three 
months ago to talk about this problem, and to realize the 
emergency that we were in, we were virtually ceasing to hear any 
civil appeals at all. A few priority civil cases were squeezed 
on calendar from time to time, but basically we were hearing 
criminal cases only, and a civil appeal when it was finally 
briefed, would according to the trend then existing, simplv lie 
there forever and never be heard. 
Our backloq had already reached the state of in excess 
of two years in some of the divisions. I work now with the 
emergency effort with the cooperation of the Chief Justice; eight 
visiting ~udges have been signed in; each of our divisions is 
split into two hearing panels. The judges are taking five 
regular cases instead of four; our central staff ... 
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CHAIRHAN HARRIS: Are the eight justices from other 
divisions? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: They are either trial judges or 
retired judges of our court ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Just sitting temporarily? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Yes. So there are eight judges 
visiting with the sixteen permanent, with the result that we are 
able to have two hearing panels in each division and we are 
hoping to dig ourselves out of this hole and be able to get back 
on top of the civil side of our caseload. The Chief Justice is 
also exercising delegated authority from the Supreme Court. She 
transferred cases to the Second District and to Justice 
Staniforth's court and we appreciate that help very much. But I 
must tell you that this urgent effort that we are making gives us 
no real prospect of getting on top of this situation. It will 
get us back in business, to some extent, but we have a situation 
that drastically needs a maior institutional reform. 
I want to get to specifics with some suggestions. The 
suggestions that I have are, I think, rather clear cut. They may 
sound simple. They are not easy. Everyone of them involves a 
difficult political choice, but that's what the Legislature has 
to do for us here, to make choi~es as to whether this state will 
attempt to continue to deal with appellate workload by continuing 
to increase the number of judges or \vhether some more fundamental 
changes are possible. 
Here, it's necessary, I think, to distinguish between 
the civil and the criminal side of our caseload, because the 
policy considerations that are involved are quite different. On 
the civil side, and here there is nothing particularly new in one 
form or another, these suggestions are already in the Feinberg 
and Seligson report which the Committee has. It seems to be 
important, however, that in the criminal appeals •.. but first 
let me back off just a moment to exclude, if I may, a number of 
possible remedies that have been talked about for years that seem 
to me unacceptable for good policy reasons. The New York 
appellate courts and the Florida appellate courts are far more 
productive than ours. I visited in both states and looked at 
their cases and looked at their work. The reason that they are 
far more productive is that there is no constitutioncl 
requirement that a case be decided by written opinion, giving 
reasons. Of course, if we got rid of that constitutional 
requirement, our courts could be made more productive. I do not 
propose that. I would oppose that vigorously. I think that our 
state is not so poor that we need to remove this guarantee of 
quality and protection of regularity and reviewability of 
appellate decisions. So I'm not proposing that that be done. 
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time in the First District. And I can smell in a given case 
where there is a big money judgment that the insurance company 
doesn't want to because they have the difference between our 
statutory rate and 20 to 22 percent value of money at the 
present time. It simply should be changed. 
CHAIID1AN HARRIS: Mr. Cramer has a question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN JIM CRA}1ER: Mr. Justice, I was just 
wondering, aside from changing the interest penalties or changing 
the interest associated with that, if there was a frivolous 
appeal, would it be useful for the appellate court to identify 
that and attach a penalty with that? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Yes. As you know, there is a 
statute presently, and also a rule of court, that authorizes the 
court to impose a penalty which is taxable as costs, where the 
appeal is taken "solelv for the purpose of delay." However, this 
provision is very little used. We quit using it because the 
Supreme Court would so frequently knock it out. Recently, when 
some -- I'm not going to use names, but I'll tell you actually 
what happened, and there were some new people who came on the 
Supreme Court and in conversation, one of them said to me, "Why 
don't you ever use this penalty provision. Are you aware of 
that?" And so I sa we gave it up because it wouldn't hold up, 
so the new judge said, "You might try it again sometime. There 
might be a new spirit." So ahout a month later, I saw such a 
case and reported the conversation to my colleagues, and we 
assessed a $1500 penalty, with an opinion giving reasons to why 
we thought it was appropriate. There was a vote of three judges 
on the Supreme Court to grant a hearing, obviously on that issue. 
Since that time, in other of the cases, not in our division, a 
hearing has been granted. Obviously on that issue. So there is 
simply no reality to this as the court isn't going to exercise 
its muscle over this kind of a thing when ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN CRAMER: Excuse me, Mr. Justice, do you 
think that budgetary realities may force a rethinking? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Possibly. 
CHAIID1AN HARRIS: In other words, we are, I think, of a 
mind that perhaps economic realities would have the same effect 
on you that it has had on us, that you find yourself constrained, 
that you are go make some critical decisions that otherwise 
you wouldn't make. 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: The trouble is, I don't see the link 
being made in the minds of the people who have that decision to 
make. 
CHAIRYillN HARRIS: If they find that they can't get as 
much paper as they used to get, they may complain about it and 
they may quit bench. 
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JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Let me suggest something that is 
also in the Seligson and Feinberg report. It seems to have much 
greater po~ential, and that is the idea of a modified scheme of 
indemnity costs. Now here again the American and the British 
traditions are totally at variance. The British tradition is 
that the prevailing party receives indemnity for his costs, 
including attorneys' fees at every level. The American tradition 
is exactly to the contrary. The prevailing party does not 
receive attorneys' fees as costs unless there is a special 
provision in the statutes or in a contract that is being sued on. 
Now what I'm proposing here is that there should be, by 
statute, a provision, either directly making allowance for 
indemnity costs on a modified basis, or perhaps authorization for 
the Judicial Council to do this by rule. My own preference would 
not be for the ... I think the Seligson report speaks of $500 to 
$1500 dollars going to the prevailing party. I don't think that 
approaches it correctly, in my own view I would propose that the 
prevailing party on an appeal should recover as costs, to be 
fixed along with his other costs on appeal, his real attorneys' 
fees, which may be a good deal more than that, in every case, 
unless the appellate court, in its opinion, wj.thholds operation 
of this by certifying that the appeal is one that should have 
been taken or should have been resisted on some probable cause 
standard. 
Now, if you had an institutional defendant who is now 
taking an appeal order to avoid paying a judgment, realizing 
that unless a good case is made on this appeal, if it loses, it 
is going to pay big attorneys fees, then you will motivate that 
party to evaluate the appeal more carefully. This I think would 
be a much bigger factor than the little one of penalties on 
frivolous appeals. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Robinson has a question. 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Okay. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Justice, are you suggesting 
that cap on post-judgment interests? Or 
sts? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN~ No. I would say post-judgment 
interest on 
ASSEHDLYMAN ROBINSON: And would you lift the cap 
totally in other words, perhaps tying it to the prime rate? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: My own proposal would be that that 
should be delegated to a Judicial Council rule with the direction 
that the interest rate should reflect the value of money. So you 
wouldn't have to qo the the Legislature every time the prime rate 
changes. A rule could say that this year interest on the 
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judgment is 20 percent because that's what the prime rate is. 
Next year, it might be 18. 
ASSEHBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well there would be some 
reluctance, I think, to that concept of tota delegation. I 
think some parameters should be set out for the Judicial Council 
to set that rule. The prime for example is a very debatable 
thing. No one really calls money at the prime rate. It's either 
borrowed at prime, plus two, or they borrow at something below 
prime. 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: I don't have a specific answer, but 
I favor that kind of approach ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: In other words, total 
flexibility. Okay. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask a couple of pointed 
questions if I might. One: Is there a way, in your estimation, 
that we can do what you suggest as it relates to written opinions 
as they currently are performed in our court of appeals? But at 
the same time, given a little more cursory review, a little 
quicker review, perhaps with the process of, particularly in 
larger counties, designating a judge to preclear, to look for 
error, trying to cite whether or not he sees reversible errors 
that might be considered on appeal, so that when they get to the 
appellate court, they be viewed a little quicker, just from the 
standpoint that you have some confidence in the trial courts ... 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: I was much interested, Mr. Harris, 
when you mentioned this same idea a little earlier this morning. 
It's one I'd not heard of before. My inclination is to doubt 
that it's a good idea to insert another gate or another hurdle in 
this process. My inclination is instead to motivate the guy who 
is initiating the appeal way back at the beginning to think more 
realistically and make a sound choice as to whether there should 
be an appeal. When that happens, I say don't hold him back, 
let's adjudicate the appeal quickly. 
ASSE:£11.BLYMAN CRM1ER: Mr. Harris, were you thinking of 
that being the trial judge or some ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I had a little problem with the trial 
judge himself, rendering the opinion, that's what I was trying to 
have, a separate party, a theoretically more independent party 
who might in fact, by virtue of his experience, serve as a 
quasi-appellate jurist within a superior court. Simply to review 
for error with some direct criteria that he would look for and if 
in fact deterMines -- it still would be able to go up to the 
appellate court for review, but he would have a sort of 
preclearing ability to determine whether or not those criteria 
had been met or not. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN CRAMER: The reason I asked that -- do you 
think the motion for a new trial on those kind of procedures has 
not been ~fect~ve at the trial level? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I vvould like to hear Mr. Christi.:m. 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, I do have my doubts. The way 
a criminal appeal starts in England is this way: It is by the 
convicted defendant applying to the trial judge for leave to 
appeal, and that trial judge, if he allows the appeal, will make 
a legal aid order. Having watched the operation, I am impressed 
by it, but I have no thought that we have that much confidence in 
our judges that this would be politically acceptable in this 
country. I simply don't propose that. There may be a way along 
the lines that you suggested, but I don't know. 
CHAIP~AN HARRIS: Let me ask another question. And that 
is this: There seems to be a "pass the buck" kind of attitude 
relative to looking at the appellate process. In other words, we 
kind of look to the Judicial Council and say, "Well, why don't 
you come up '"'i th some recommendations?" We know if there is not 
a problem -- just with the process, there is certainly going to 
be a fiscal problem that's going to call for some reformation or 
correction. Then the courts look obviously at the Legislature, 
and say, 11, some of these are legislative priorities." I'm 
wondering if you have any recommendations. Should we create a 
new entity to look at the appellate process? Shall we have a 
task force within the Legislature? How can we in fact move from 
talking about the problems and trying to really come up with 
concrete solutions that are going to work? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, my experience in other areas 
has been that the special study commission or special legislative 
body's review of the problem, can work very effectively when 
there is a general perception among the people involved, but you 
are really under the gun in this particular problem. The example 
is the Tort Claims Act. We were then under the gun, something 
had to be done, and a Joint Commission was established. It 
worked very effectively and did very well. More recently there 
was a joint legislative study in the area of tort law which was 
not effective and not because there weren't able people involved; 
but because there was not a perception on the part of everybody 
involved, including the Legislature, that anything really had to 
be done. So no~hing happened. And I don't know if people are 
serious yet about this situation. I think our problem is 
critical. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Robinson, are you serious? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: 1 think Mr. Gampell is well aware 
of how serious I am. 
-33--
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: I want to say one more thing. One 
more suggestion and this is the most difficult area of the law, 
and that's in the criminal appeals area. Hov1 do you motivate the 
indigent appellate to think carefully and to take legal advice 
before he decides to make an appeal that's going to cost him 
nothing? 
Because it costs him nothing at present and because the 
trial court on pronouncing judgment must inform the a.ppellate of 
his right to appeal, and of the fact that if he is indigent, 
counsel will be provided for him without cost, there is a very 
high rate of appeal. Why not, it doesn't cost him anything. In 
fact, the statistics are surprising, they show that there is a 
rate of appeal of more than 100 percent compared with contested 
dispositions and the reason for that impossibility is that there 
are appeals after pleas of guilty as well, where there hasn't 
been a contested disposition. So, in effect, we are getting 
appeals in more than 100 percent of the cases. 
ASSEMBLYHAN ROBINSON: Is that true in pre-trial 
motions? It is not just on final disposition? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, the only pre-trial motion that 
comes to us, of course, is the 1538.5 on a writ and under 
subsection m on the appeal. I think it's anomalous, but I will 
tell you it's not a big deal, it's not one of the big problems. 
It's there, but it's not a huge one like these other things we 
are talking about. 
You have on your agenda, for later today, an appearance 
by Professor r1oskovitz of Golden Gate University, and I'm not 
going to anticipate what he has to say, but I want to say with 
all the emphasis that I can, it is time for us to use ingenuity 
in devising some financial incentive that will cause the indigent 
defendant in the criminal case to go through the same kind of a 
mental process that the non-indigent defendant does when he 
decides to appeal or not. Professor Moskovitz has a proposal 
that came originally from Professor Maurice Rosenberg at 
Columbia. It's a proposal that has not been tried for creating a 
modest financial incentive that will cause this defendant to 
think before he decides ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Some assessment. In other words that 
he may have to pay it back, i.e., a loan ... 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, there are different ways of 
doing it. Rosenberg started this off, and I la.ughE=>d the first 
time I heard it. His idea v1as that there should be, at the 
prison, a little fund called the indigent defense and 
rehabilitation fund. So you credit to each prisoner, he 
originally proposed $100, and then the prisoner, if he decides to 
appeal, can appeal, but he has to chip in to the extent of his 
$100, that doesn't meet the cost, the whole cost is much greater, 
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he chips in to that extent, and so he thinks a bit before he 
appeals, he might ask somebody, well, if I appeal, is there any 
chance that I'll make it? And his counsel may advise him, no, 
that the1 is no ctrguable issue here. If he does not appeal, 
then when he get out, he gets the $100 as walking around monev 
for the ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: It's a good idea. We're going to 
have to look into something ... 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Now you laugh when you first hear 
that. We must find a way to bring some real thought into this 
process instead of starting this paperwork treadmill in every 
case. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: On the way to the hearing this 
morning my consultant was giving me a little briefing on that 
proposal. M~. Hoskovitz is proposing a $500 -- on the surface of 
it, it sounds very interesting and I think it does provide that 
motivational thing that you are talking about. Politically, 
however, I have a little problem with voting for an effective 
$500 grant to a convicted felon. I'm not exactly sure how I 
would go about explaining that to my constituency, that if you 
are convicted of a felony, you are going to be given the benefit 
of $500 from the people of the State of California, even though 
ostensibly, it might save greater funds in the long term ... 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Perhaps that's not quite the way ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: That's what I'm suggesting. I 
think I understand what Mr. Moskovitz and yourself are 
suggestinn,. J'm just wondering, isn't there some other type of 
incentive that can be provided or disincentive, if you will ... 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, I'll tell you one and I'll 
tell you what is done in the United Kingdom, again, which I don't 
recommend. There is a provision that if you apply to the trial 
judge for leave to appeal and he denies it, then you can apply to 
the court of appeal for leave to appeal, and the panel of three 
will look at the -- they have a different kind of record than 
what we have -- they'll examine the thing, and they may grant 
leave to appeal, and if they do, again, legal aid comes in and 
lawyers are appointed and the wh0le process goes on. If they 
deny leave, they may add on the end of the term, the time during 
which thi procedure's been pending, and that I understand is a 
pov1erful incentive to not appeal, unless you have ... Again, I'm 
not suggesting that, ... 
ASSEMBLY~~AN IMBRECHT: Let me just pursue one other line 
that is somethinq similar to what Mr. Harris was suggesting 
earlier about a ~ort of pre-appellate view process to see if 
there is any clearer air, or anything of that nature. What if 
vou were to designate -- say the PJ of a superior court with 
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respect to all criminal appeals, to undertake such a preliminary 
review and -- I don't know if it would be possible to preclude an 
appeal or if such an individual indicated that it was unlikely to 
be grounds for successful ~ppeal but, perhaps at that point, 
trigger a reasonably substantial disincentive, maybe even 
something akin to what the British system is but not having the 
same -- not having the trial judge reviewing his own work -- but 
another member of the court that would have principle 
responsibilities ... 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, I think something like that 
has potential. There are some basic things we would want to look 
at. We v.1ant to have immediacy and personal contact, so it should 
not be a paper process. It should involve people who know what 
really happened in the trial court, like the prosecutor, like 
defense counsel, like the trial judge or somebody in that same 
court. This ought to happen before the whole mechanism of 
working up a record has been set in motion. 
There is an experiment going on in the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court right. now, that. is a little bit of a variation from 
this, that I'd like to mention to you, and that's a small state. 
There is no intermediate court and so the Supreme Court, of 
course, is the court of first and last appeal. They are handling 
first appeal cases like ours. And what they've done is thjs. 
They have a very broad rule-making power. When the notice of 
appeal is filed, one of the justices convenes a meeting within a 
few days involving the defense coun8el and the prosecutor. The 
purpose of this meeting is like a settlement conference but of 
course, you can't settle a criminal appeal; but at this meeting, 
the judge listens to the story as to what this case is about. 
The defense counsel says, "Well, there was prosecutory misconduct 
here; this instruction should have been given." So the judge 
listens to what the other side has to say. He has the trial 
court file. He asks what really happened; he walks around the 
case a little bit and then he decides whether he thinks this case 
is a winner or not. If he thinks it's a loser, he issues an 
order to show cause, returnable before the whole court, why the 
appeal should not be dismissed, or there should not be a summary 
reversal. If he thinks it's a winner, he issues an order to show 
cause, returnable before the whole court, why there should not be 
a summary affirmance. 
Now the point of this is that there is personal and 
immediate contact. Nobody's going to get lost in some paperwork 
shuffle. And then there is no disposition, either a reversal or 
an affirmance without the whole court having seen counsel and 
heard arguments. Now this is an experiment that's just started 
that's been under way only about six weeks now, so it's a little 
too early to say. But, that's quite similar I think to what Mr. 
Harris suggested and you did, too, Mr. Imbrecht, of a procedure 
that gets in early to try to sort out potential winners from the 
potential losers. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: I'm curious, because you seem to 
clearly demonstrate knowledge about some of the efforts that have 
been undertaken and other courses that deal with some of these 
problems. Is this a reflection of your personal investigation, 
or is there some source authority that we might turn to as well, 
that reviews these kinds of •.. 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, I took an interest in this 
when I was Director of the National Center for State Courts, for 
two years, and since that time, I have been lecturing on 
appellate administration each summer in the seminars at New York 
University and for that purpose I keep track of what's going on 
around the country. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CRAMER: Just so I can better understand 
what you are saying to me. One recommendation is you v1ant to pay 
defendants not to appeal, when you cut away, that's what you are 
saying to me? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Yes, sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CRAMER: And then you're talking about a 
pre-trial appellate procedure. Do you imagine that pre-trial 
appellate procedure being done in the local jurisdiction on the 
trial court level? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: That's where I think it should be 
done in order to preserve immediacy and real personal contact, 
rather than have the paper process. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CRAMEE: Okay. So you don't want a record 
prepared, but you would want to subject either the presiding 
judge or some judge of that court essentially to the appellate 
arguments, the case law reading that may very well be required, 
so in effect, you are creating a new and different procedure or 
administr~tive position at the trial court level? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, I'm asking to reserve judgment 
on this because I don't think what we want to do is set up a new 
hurdle or a new process and so there may be another way entirely 
of doing this such as, you know, representative of our court, a 
judge or exper:Lenced staff member could take that function just 
as well as another judge of a busy trial court. So we're just 
beginning to think about this and I'm not ready to jump ... 
ASSEMBLYrv1.AN CRAMER: Do you have some opinions about 
those individuals who plead guilty and who appeal; how often that 
would be a successful adventure into the appellate court? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, unfortunately, there is a very 
high nunber of those cases and unfortunately, some of those cases 
are meritorious. The trial judges are having a terrible time 
with the determinate sentence law. It is full of traps for then; 
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they make mistakes all the time. I have thought that that's part 
of the sentencing function that really ought to be given to an 
escrm..r clerk rather than to a judge, it's become so complex. And 
so after there has been a plea of guilty, judgment has been 
pronounced and a lot of priors and consecutiveness as against 
concurrency, and all these other factors are worked out, then 
there is an appeal and then we go back over this thing --
nit-picking it -- and we find error in a high proportion of those 
cases. 
ASSEHBLYMAN CRAMER: Some states have embarked upon a 
procedure whereby they have two different appellate divisions 
one, civil and one, criminal. You organized your talk along 
those lines and I wonder if you are making that as a •.. 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: No, I certainly don't. The people 
who have thought about this are really -- I guess unanimously 
opposed to it. The trend is the other way. There are several 
reasons for it, one is that if you have a separate criminal 
appellate court, this tends to become a low status court. It's 
hard to get resources for it and the judges get case-hardened. 
You should hear Chief Judge Jack Onion of Texas who is the Chief 
Judge of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Texas explaining what's 
wrong with that system. Now Texas has just abolished it. 
Louisiana has recently abolished it. There are only two states 
left with it, Tennessee and Oklahoma. I certainly would not urge 
that we do anything like that. 
ASSEMBLYf1AN CRAMER: So aside from putting pressures on 
people, you are nor prepared then to recommend to this body or to 
any other body to narrow the appellate rights of criminal 
defendants? 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: No, sir. I'm not. I see so much 
payout a'•ailable in the other areas that I've mentioned that I'd 
like to ~o those things first. 
Mr. Chairman, you've been very hospitable. Are there 
other questions? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Justice, I want to thank you. vve 
have certainly been enlightened by your comments and have been 
well educated. I know we usually don't share confidential notes 
fro~ nembers of the Committee. But when you came up, Mr. 
Imbrecht ha~ded me a note and said this is one of the real fast 
justices in our appellate court system and I think that is 
something that ought t.o be shared and we appreciate the 
information you offered. 
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Thank you. I may move into Mr. 
Imbrecht's district. 
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ASSEMBLY~~N WILLIAM LEONARD: He's not sure where that 
district is. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. We are going to move this 
hearing along very quickly now and I hope that you will excuse 
me. The first three witnesses certainly have given us the 
foundation and much of what may be said afterward I think will be 
reflective of the comments of our first three witnesses. It is 
my intent to be out of this hearing within the next hour no 
more than an hour and 25 minutes, by 1:30 at the latest, we are 
going to take a lunch break. So, I am going to ask your 
indulgence and your speed if you have written comments, we would 
like to have them. If you do not, we will keep the record open 
so that they might be submitted. We'd ask for summary comments 
that will allow us to ask questions if we choose, but otherwise I 
would appreciate your speed and not just rambling; we don't need 
it. 
Our next witness is Mr. Leonard Sacks, the Chair of the 
Amicus Curiae Committee, California Trial Lawyers Association. 
Mr. Sacks, welcome and we appreciate your comments. 
MR. LEONARD SACKS: Thank you. I will be giving these 
comments on behalf of the California Trial Lawyers Association as 
Qn appellate specialist, but primarily I represent injured 
victims of torts on the plaintiff's side, and I was, of course, 
tremendously gratified to hear Justice Christian make the point 
that I felt -- I'm not aoing to belabor it -- the fact that there 
is a very real possibility that institutional defendants with 
large judgments against them are using the appellate courts as a 
very profitable bank. And along that line, I would suggest that 
perhaps this Committee would want to interrogate some of these 
institutional defendants to get their point of view on it, such 
as the large insurance companies, the insurer for the Pacific 
Southwest Airlines which is involved in many an appeal over that 
air crash. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: We can predict your testimony and 
theirs. The Committee's very knowledgeable on that subject. 
MR. SACKS: Well, my point is this: Let's have them say 
under oath that this is not a consideration when they appeal, if 
they are willing to say that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: They're willing to say anything. 
MR. SACKS: I hope I can quote you on that the next time 
I'm in court. 
ASSEMBLYfvlAN ROBINSON: Well, all of you are. I mean 
both the trial lawvers as well as the institutional defendants 
before this Committee are willing to say whatever they feel is 
necessary to get the requisite number of votes and we're ... 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Sacks, do you have any specific 
recorrunendations on the appellate process, how we can make it more 
efficient? 
MR. SACKS: Yes, well there's one thing I think nobody's 
mentioned and that is the State of California itself is, in my 
opinion, somebody that you might look at as a prime culprit. Now 
you have, for example, the Attorney General of the state. It's 
my impression that every time there is a tort judgment against 
the state, and this may also be true of local entities too, but 
perhaps more the state, there is automatically an appeal. They 
are a kind of litigant that possibly does not have the 
disincentives that private litigants do and they get involved in 
a lot of things that possibly they should not get involved in. 
The main thing that is my great gripe is that this Legislature a 
few years ago passed a law indicating that it is the public 
policy of this state that physicians have malpractice insurance. 
Now physicians have malpractice insurance in certain companies 
that have gone insolvent, Signal and Imperial I believe are two 
of the companies. Then you have Signal and Imperial's business 
being turned over to the California Insurance Guarantee 
Association and the California Insurance Guarantee Association 
taking steps to eliminate many of these claims which both 
shortchange the physician and the injured plaintiff on the basis 
of technical claim filings and these have resulted in vigorous 
litigation and who do we find on the side of the CIGA but the 
Attorney General and there are numerous cases like this. I don't 
think the Attorney General should even be bringing these cases 
but this is one very serious area where you've got a lot of 
appeals and possibly I would like to ask the justices whether 
they see a lot of state appeals that aren't meritorious. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON Mr. Sacks, on that issue, as a 
former member of the old Select Committee on Medical Malpractice, 
did the state not by administrative fiat put those two companies 
into conservatorship? 
MR. SACKS: I think so, yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: And that very act exposes the 
state to liability for that conservatorship and that's the reason 
for the Attorney General's involvement in those cases. I mean I 
think the record should reflect that there is a state taxpayer 
who has something at stake in those cases by the Ministerial acts 
of the Insurance Commissioner during the period of 
conservatorship. 
MR. SACKS: Well, I think this is true. It may have a 
taxpayer impact. The CIGA absorbed some of it but the point is 
that the state is perhaps appealing in every single instance 
where there's a taxpayer impact regardless of the prospects of 
success and then every time the state does get into a case they 
always ask that the o~inion he certified which also brings in a 
lot of problems. I'm just suggesting that as one area. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: No, I understand that. In the 
Legislature and Mr. Imbrecht is Vice-Chairman of Ways and Means 
Committee is well aware of it. Ways and Means, this year, for 
the first time, has taken a policy position that any state agency 
that involves itself in useless litigation before the appellate 
courts and ends up having attorney fees awarded against it as a 
result thereof have had those attorneys' fees taken out of their 
standing budget so it's costing them staff attorneys' time and 
that's about the only disincentive that the Legislature is 
capable of applying against and it's not just the Attorney 
General of the state, it's many other agencies that have involved 
themselves currently in litigation, Consumer Affairs and what 
have you. That disincentive is built in so they have the same 
disincentive that a private law firm would have in pursuing a 
non-meritorious case in the appellate courts. Am I correct? 
MR. SACKS: Well, I don't know. They've got attorneys 
working for them and you know it's not like it's private 
parties ... 
ASSEMBLY~ffiN ROBINSON: If it's a non-meritorious case 
and the courts in their wisdom decide to impose attorney fees 
against them as the unsuccessful litigant, it's coming out of 
their budget believe me. That is a disincentive to pursue cases 
that they have no business pursuing. 
MR. SACKS: Well, I don't think that it applies to the 
scope of cases that I'm talking about here. Certainly we cannot 
get penalties for frivolous appeals and these cases are in the 
numerous tort judgments against the state which they will ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: But if you pray for them you're 
apt to get them. 
MR. SACKS: Excuse me. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: If you pray for penalties you're 
apt to get them. Statutorily, the courts are empowered to award 
them and have done so. 
ASSEMBLY~ffiN IMBRECHT: We need to expedite this hearing. 
While Mr. Harris is on the phone, I'm going to exercise my 
prerogatives as Vice-Chairman of the Committee and thank you very 
much for your testimony. 
Next on our agenda is Mr. PauJ Cyril, Association of 
Defense Counsel. He'll be here later I'm informed. Mr. Michael 
Berger, past. Pn:.sident of the Academy of Appellate Lawyerf', 
Vice-Chair of the Committee on Appellate Courts of the State Bar. 
r1r. Berqer. 
MR. MICHAEL BERGER: Thank you, sir. I'm pleased to be 
here on bchnlf of both of those organizations, boi:h of which have 
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pretty much the same sort of feelings about the problems we're 
facing. I don't want to take a whole lot of your time. I think 
Justice Christian did an admirable job of explaining to you what 
some the problems are re. I hope the shocking thing 
that did say took root here in the Corrmlittee and that is that 
his court is virtually turned into a court of criminal appeals. 
There is a serious problem with the mass number of really 
worthless criminal appeals that are choking the system and I 
think something has got to be done about that problem trying to 
find some way ro keep some of those appeals out of the system. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Has the State Bar Committee 
worked on any recowmendations in that area? 
MR. BERGER: The State Bar Committee is at the moment 
working on a series of recommendations and some of the things 
which we are considering deal with the kinds of incentives and 
disincentives that Justice Christian talked about. I think we 
have to come to the point of considering monetary incentives. I 
think we have to consider the other thing that convicted 
criminals are interesred in and that is time. If we don't tack 
time on to the end of the sentence perhaps you can consider not 
taking an appeal to be good behavior and give them time off the 
sentence. I think it's time we have to consider plea bargaining 
on appealing criminal cases. We've got to do something to choke 
down the numbt?r, to make them understand that they have some 
reason not to take the free automatic appeal that they have at 
the moment. 
ASSEMBLY~~N IMBRECHT: Mr. Berger, when do you expect 
those recommendations to be available? 
MR. BERGER: I believe we've been cleared to pass on our 
report as a report of the committee itself though not of the 
State Bar since the Board of Governors has not acted on it as 
yet. I will check on that. If that's true, I'll be happy to 
supply a copy. 
ASSEMBLY~~N ROBINSON: Are you looking at the 
determinate sentencing law that was enacted by the Legislature in 
'77 and I think '76? 
MR. BERGER: I don't think that that has been 
specifically mentioned. 
ASSEMBLYr.tf..AN ROBINSON: We 1, example, one of the 
incen s might be, and it's just an that I just had, that 
the determinate sentencing law has set a formula for good time 
that all prisoners get unless there's a finding to the contrary, 
you know, if they do something, if they're incorrigible or what 
not and then the Adult Authority then can subtract from the good 
time that they would get. I think it's 10 percent or 20 percent 
of the sentence. That might be used as disincentives to 
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frivolous appeals without making that a standard frivolous appeal 
would be a standard for removing good time credit. 
MR. BERGER: It's certainly something to think about. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: And it would not be enhancement. 
I think the civil libertarians in the Legislature as well as in 
the public at large would probably revolt a little bit if we had 
the English system of adding time just for exercising a 
constitutional right. 
MR. BERGER: I would agree with you which is why I think 
we've got to seriously consider giving them something rather than 
adding a punishment at the end and as distasteful as that may be 
in some mouths, the cost to the state and the citizens is just 
too great. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Imbrecht hit on the political 
problem. You're not going to get away with giving a $500 bounty. 
MR. BERGER: It would be awfully hard to imagine how one 
could explain that in their newsletter. 
(UNKNOWN) Well, maybe we can do it in terms of time 
then instead of money. That may be more palatable. 
ASSEMBLYMAN H1BRECHT: Mr. Berger, might I ask you to 
communicate to the members of your committee the intense interest 
of this legislative Committee in pursuing this subject and ask 
you to perhaps expedite your consideration? I would certainly 
appreciate it if you could offer some recommendations to us by 
December, but by the first of the year at the latest, since we're 
going to have to pursue this legislatively at the beginning of 
L'Tanuarv. 
MR. BERGER: We are under a mandate from the State Bar 
to come up with recommendations and a program that we've 
presented the board is that we want to be able to do this on an 
item by item basis. As soon as something comes up we want to be 
able to present it to you. Rather than trying to put together 
some sort of massive package and running it through the Board of 
Governors, we want to work on specific recommendations, the kind 
you're interested in and we'd be very happy to work very closely 
with your Committee. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HmRECHT: Thank you very much. Is there 
anything further you'd care to offer? 
MR. BERGER: There were a couple of other things on the 
criminal side that I think bear some consideration. One is the 
appeals after guilty pleas on things that didn't happen after the 
plea. There are those appeals that deal with substantive issues 
t:bat_ cccur_red hefo::-e +_he guLLty ple;_;_ aEcc_ "-'~n,~r'f' f:l!r:tf" cn'cf't-"l0n, T 
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think, that at least ought to be discussed about whether those 
appeals ought to be cut off. Second, there are the kinds of 
criminal cases where the sentence imposed after trial in superior 
court is in fact a misdemeanor sentence so you don't have a 
felony conviction. Maybe the courts of appeal ought not to be 
concerned with misdemeanor convictions. Maybe that ought to be 
diverted some place else, perhaps the appellate depart~ent of the 
superior court, but you, in effect, have the court of appeal 
working on misdemeanor convictions and there are a fair number of 
those. 
One other thing, I was glad to see that there still is 
some interest in eliminating the divisional set-ups that we have 
particularly in Los Angeles and San Francisco. Both the Academy 
and the State Bar Committee are still intensely interested in 
that though we felt that, given the three new courts that were 
established in the last session, the Legislature had lost some 
interest in even pursuing it. The State Bar Committee did draft 
a proposed bill during the past year though, it didn't get up to 
you and I'd be pleased to send that along as well, if that's of 
any interest to the Committee. We think that it may be a way to 
even up the workload, what's going on in the courts of appeal as 
well as to provide more substantive justice to those people who 
are ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: I am still very much interested 
in this topic. I carried the legislation that passed the 
Assembly and unfortunately it was heavily personally lobbied by a 
number of appellate justices who have political ties to their 
former colleagues in the State Senate. I think that's the 
fairest description I can possibly give as to why the bill was 
not successful in the State Senate but things have changed and 
the personalities on the Judiciary Committee have changed, not to 
mention the 5th District which has changed and so I think that 
there might be a better climate for those kinds of proposals. 
MR. BERGER: I can tell you then that both of ~" 
organizations are still intensely interested in that and will be 
h~ppy to work with you on that too. 
One final item if I might. I noticed that the letters 
that '"ere sent out to us mentioned some concern about the impact 
of the Judicial Council's circuit riding experiment. All I can 
say is that with the creation of three new courts, I don't see 
how there can be anv circuit riding experiment. I think it's 
been effectively killed but it will he interesting to see what 
happens. You've eliminated the places where they could have sat. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Well, they're going to have to do 
something with the justices in the First District. They might as 
well ride a circuit. 
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MR. BERGER: That would be fine if there were a place 
for them to go. I'd like to have seen them go to San Jose but I 
was overruled on that. 
ASSEMBLYl~N IMBRECHT: Thank you very much, Mr. Berger. 
MR. BERGER: Thank you. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Before we continue, I just wanted 
to notice the presence in our audience and invite her to come 
forward, Assemblywoman Cathie Wright of Simi Valley has joined 
us. Cathie, if you'd like to join us here on the dais, you're 
certainly more than welcome. Next, I'd like to call Mr. Rudolfo 
Aros. Mr. Aros is not able to be with us. Terry Smerling. Is 
there anyone else here from the American Civil Liberties Union 
who wishes to testify? All right, fine, we'll move right along. 
Mr. Vance Raye. Vance is the Senior Assistant Attorney General 
for Leaislative Affairs. We see him frequently in Sacramento at 
our Committee hearings. 
MR. VANCE RAYE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think many 
of the comments I would have ma.de have been made already, so I' 11 
be relatively brief. The Attorney General, of course, has an 
interest in appellate court efficiency since the Attorney General 
appears through various deputies before the courts of appeal and 
the Supreme Court of the state on a fairly regular basis. Just 
last year, our office spent over 175,000 hours of personnel time 
preparing respondents briefs in criminal cases alone. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: 175,000 hours? 
MR. RAYE: 175,000 hours of attorney time on criminal 
appeals. I think one witness has already referred somewhat 
critically to our role in civil appeals also on behalf of other 
state agencies and that hour figure doesn't include the amount of 
time that we spend on civil appeals. The number of criminal 
appeals that our offices handle has increased dramatically over 
the past ten years. In 1970 we prepared approximately 2400 
respondent's briefs. In 1980 that fiqure rose to well over 4,000 
briefs. The cost of handling these appeals is of course fairly 
substantial. We estimate that it costs us well in eycess of 
$~,000 per respondent's brief to file, to prepare respondent's 
briefs and to appear before the court of a peal and Supreme Court 
in these cases. When you consider that those cost figures are 
duplicated by the State Public Defender's Office and are, as I 
understand it, exceeded bv the cost that it takes, the costs of 
the court of appeal in co~sidering these appeals, then I think 
you get a pretty clear picture of the substantial amount of cost 
money expended by the state on criminal appeals. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Probably in the neighborhood of 
$10,000 per appeal at a minimura. 
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MR. RAYE: Probably so, somewhere in that neighborhood. 
So it stands to reason that if we reduce the number of appeals, 
then we also effect a substantial cost reduction which is, of 
course, crit 1 in these times of austerity. With this in mind, 
our office considering a number of proposals to reduce the 
amount of time it takes us to respond to criminal appeals. We 
think, first of all, that something ought to be done about the 
right to appeal. Neither th~ California Supreme Court nor the 
U.S. Supreme Court, as someone has already pointed out, has ever 
articulated a constitutional right to appeal. We think the 
substantial increase in the number of appeals over the past ten 
years does not mean that the trial courts are committing more 
errors. It just means that people are appealing on more 
insubstantial issues. We've ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Do you have any figures, Vance? 
Of the 4,000 briefs that were filed last year, how many of those 
represented indigent criminal appeals? 
MR. RAYE: Approximately, as I understand it, almost all 
of those. About 93 percent, as I understand it, of the criminal 
appeals filed are indigent appeals. Somewhere in the 
neighborhood of 90 percent in any event, so a substantial number 
of those are indigent appeals. Therefore, you have the same 
cos~s beinq incurred on the other side by the Public Defender's 
office. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Do you have any statistics as to 
the success rate? 
MR. RAYE: As I understand it, the affirmance rate is 
about 90 percent, about 11 percent of criminal appeals result in 
reversals of the trial court decision so about 90 percent of all 
appeals are affirmed by the court of appeal. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IJI.1BRECHT: So it would not be unreasonable 
to suggest then that even assuming a 10 percent factor of 
legitimate appeals that were nevertheless had the trial court 
decision affirmed but that there was a legitimate issue to be 
discussed so we're probably looking at 70 to 80 percent of the 
criminal appeals being filed as being perhaps in the frivolous 
category. Is that too great a percentage? 
MR RAYE: I think that's a fair estimate. 
ASSEMBLY~~N IMBRECHT: Okay. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: How many of them were guilty 
pleas that were then subsequently appealed because of sentencing 
questions? 
MR. RAYE: We don't have figures. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Would it be too hard to get 
those? 
MR. RAYE: There's a substantial number. In fact our 
office sponsored some legislation this year which would have 
placed some restrictions on the right to appeal from guilty pleas 
because of our perception that that number is fairly substantial. 
(UNKNOWN): Is that a Doolittle bill? 
MR. RAYE: No, that was Senator Boatwright's bill, SB 
383. 
ASSEMBLY~.AN ROBINSON: If we've got drafting mistakes or 
we have problems with the understanding by the trier fact of our 
intent in SB 42 that's causing a substantial number of appeals 
that were guilty pleas, just strictly because of a poor 
interpretation of SB 42, then I think that we ought to address 
that. The Legislature ought to address it and we're going to 
need hard facts in order to do that because of the delicate 
compromises that were involved in this original legislation. 
MR. RAYE: Well, as I understand it, there are a 
significant number of appeals from guilty pleas on sentencing 
issues. In many cases those issues are fairly clear cut and the 
resolution of the issues is fairly clear cut. We're almost in 
the position of stipulating to the outcome of the appeal where 
the trial court clearly committed error. 
ASSEHBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, if we knew that number then 
we could take care of that part of the workload right there and 
Justice Christian said earlier that there was a significant 
number of those and your office since it will certainly have 
access to 90 percent of the cases and if you could give us some 
hard data ... 
. MR. RAYE: Well, regrettably our statistics haven't 
broken down the appeals by ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I would suggest that you broaden 
your statistical base so that we can have that information and 
look at it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Please continue. 
MR. RAYE: As I mentioned, we think there should be some 
limitation on the righ~ to appeal in consideration of the fact 
that over 90 percent of crimi.naJ appeals result in affirmance and 
a substantial number of that 90 percent r;ould be characterized as 
frivolous appeals. lJe think there are two ways to restrict the 
right to appeal. One way is the way that's set forth in a bill 
that we sponsored, SB 1197 by Senator Doolittle, which would 
invest in the trial court the responsibility for preliminarily 
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reviewing all ls. Appeal would be only by certificate of 
appeal granted a tr 1 court. The denial of a certificate of 
appeal wou be reviewable by writ of mandate to the court of 
appea only. We thought that that would be at least one 
approach. We 11 do think that's one approach to dealing with 
the sub se in the number of appeals. Another 
proposal that we're considering is vesting discretion not with 
the trial court but with the court of appeal to decide whether an 
appeal, on face, presents substantial issues that warrant 
consideration a panel by the court of appeal. In other words, 
appeal would be effect by a writ of certiorari to the court of 
appeal and the court of appeal would have discretion to refuse to 
entertain an 1. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Would you suggest that it be a more 
cursory or vou think we ought to have a special panel 
or a special judge who has that responsibility for granting the 
review and certiorari, maybe not done by judges but by staff with 
recommendations to the iudges or what? 
MR. RAYE: Well, as we envisage it, the writ would be 
filed, forma but a brief or paper would be filed 
with the court of appeal ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Nothing long? 
MR. RAYE: Nothing long, simply specifying the 
allegations o error containing brief citations of authority in 
support of se ifications of error and then the court of 
appeal based on that would decide whether or not the appeal 
warranted consideration. I think one thing that has to 
be pointed out is there are cost elements in this whole 
system of c 1 appe~ls. There's the cost incurred by the 
Public Defender, our office, and by the court of appeal. 
Through this we would cut down on the cost incurred by 
our off approximately one-third of the total cost of 
handling a appeal. In addition to that, we aJso ... 
ASSEMBLY1~N ROBINSON: I would argue in favor of someone 
rather than having a DCA because I 
the DCA, there's going to have to 
locally or 
think that once 
be a record 
ASSEr·1BLYMAN IMBRECHT: I thought Justice Christian's 
sugge some sense, if you designated a 
that would undertake this review process. I 
the actual trial court judge whose error 
is being complained of reviewing his own conduct, but if you 
provided some ss whereby defendants and prosecutors and 
perhaps trial judges could briefly argue these points hefore 
another court judge so that when it's fresh and 
contemporaneous he can at that po decide upon the issuance of 
the certif t vou discussed. 
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MR. RAYE: I think our original thought was to have the 
trial court do it for the reasons that you outlined as an 
alternative and it's an alternative that we're considering. We 
haven't actually drafted the slation yet. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Imbrecht is not suggesting 
the trier of fact. Didn't Doolittle's bill have the trier of 
fact in it? 
MR. RAYE: The trier of fact with review, right. The 
judge who presided at the trial would review. We had two other 
proposals that we're also considering to expedite appeals. We 
think this Committee should consider a procedure whereby our 
office on behalf of the people can move for some reaffirmance of 
appeals filed with the court of appeal. We attempted to do this 
under existing law about three years ago and regrettably the 
Supreme Court ruled the procedure was improper as not being 
authorized and in fact being at odds with court rules and with 
statute but a statutory and possibly constitutional change could 
allow for a procedure whereby we could move for some reaffirmance 
of appeals that obviously have no merit. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: The Supreme Court decision did in fact 
mention constitutional grounds? 
.HR. RAYE: It mentioned constitutional grounds, right. 
It sort of goes off on a number of different grounds, but I think 
ultimately people ... 
ASSEMBLY~~N ROBINSON: Do you have a citation on that? 
MR. RAYE: I don't have a citation. 
People v Brigham and 25 Cal. 3rd, I believe. 
the citation, 25 ... 
The case name is 
I guess I do have 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I'm going to read that opinion. 
MR. RAYE: 25 Cal. 3rd, 283, People v Brigham. And a 
final suggestion we had was instituting a procedure whereby the 
court of appeal, and this could possibly be done by court rule, 
or just a change in internal operating procedures, whereby the 
court of appeal after reviewing the appellant's opening brief, 
defines the issues that it considers to be weighty enough to 
warrant response by our office. By doing this, this would cut 
down on the amount of time that we spend briefing issues that are 
obviously not going to be a factor in the court's ultimate 
decision on the appeal. Those are some of the suggestions, or 
some of the recommendations that are the things that we're 
considering, to deal with the problem of the appellate court's 
congestion as it relates to criminal appeals. Obviously our 
position on those recommendations or those suggestions are not 
fixed in concrete just as our position on Senator Doolittle's 
bill was not and we may or may not attempt to move that bill next 
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year, but we something has to be done or something should 
be done to reduce the substantial amount of costs incurred by the 
process of cr 1 appeals. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Raye, I'd like to ask you to 
ask your colleagues in the office and the Attorney General what 
his position would be on a scheme similar to the one that Mr. 
Justice Christian described that would take some of the good 
time, some penalty for good time, under SB 42, would apply where 
the District Court of Appeals decided that the case or the appeal 
was being pursued without merit and that that would be one of the 
reasons, that it would be a disincentive to file these appeals. 
MR. RAYE: Actually, we've talked about that. That 
would be kind of a modification of the system used in England. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: What it does is it recognizes 
that when we passed SB 42, we put in a scheme of good time. Is 
it 10 or 20 percent? I forget the time of the sentence and we 
also put in penalties. You start doing a lot of manure 
disturbing and you end up not getting that good time. It just 
seems to me that if you're also costing the taxpayers $10,000 in 
frivolous appeals that that also would be grounds for not getting 
all your good An individual would then start thinking. I 
don't think it 1d be so severe that there is no way that 
anyone would appeal because the criminal law is a growing body of 
law and, notwithstanding what the Legislature does to make it 
grow, it certa grows in the courts too. But there would be 
enough that there would be some recognition of the fact that just 
because you're the state's attorney you don't ... 
MR. RAYE: I think it warrants consideration. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Raye, does that conclude your 
remarks? 
HR. RAYE: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. I hope you'll 
listen to some o s that have been said and give us 
further auidance from your office. 
All r Mr. Moskovitz. 
MR. NYRON MOSKOVITZ: How are you Mr. Harris? Hy na.me 
is Myron ~1oskovi tz. I'm a law professor at Golden Gate 
University in San Francisco. I'm also a Berkeley resident and 
one of you constituents. 
CHAIRMAN HA.RRIS: Yes, sir. 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: I prepared this long ... 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm going to listen very attentively. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: He won't browbeat you like he did 
my constituent yesterday. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That's right. 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: I think I'll still be in your district. 
I've prepared this proposal that's in the back of your materials 
today that Mr. Justice Christian referred to and the way I carne 
at this was to figure on what's the key component that restricts 
people's use of various procedural devices whether it's appeals, 
discovery, trials, whatever, and it's mainly money. A lawyer 
says you have the right to appeal. Do you want to do it? Your 
client says, "What's this going to cost me?" "It's going to cost 
you $20,000." "What's my chances of winning?" It's 20 percent, 
30 percent, whatever and then the client decides and he balances 
that money against the chance of winning and because that happens 
in civil cases, the rate of appeal if fairly low. It's about 14 
percent. That was last year. This year is was up to 17 percent. 
As Mr. Justice Christian pointed out, in criminal cases it's 110 
percent and to me that's the key difference. Of the criminal 
appellants, 91.4 percent of them are indigent according to the 
State Public Defender's office. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Of that remaining 9 percent, 
what's the rate of appeal there? The non-indigent criminal ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You mean the rate of affirmance. 
ASSEMBLYI1AN IMBRECHT: No, the rate of appeal of the 9 
percent non-indigent criminal defendants. 
MR. MOSKOCVITZ: Of those that appeal, 91 percent are 
indigent, 9 percent are not indigent, that's all I have. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: But what would be the rate of 
affirmance amongst that 9 percent because that would give you a 
bench mark to gauge the other by. I think that's what you ••. 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: That's a good point. 
this. I mean, I had to pull a lot of strings 
information because nobody is looking at this 
Judicial Council has none of these ... 
I was lucky to get 
to get this 
problem because the 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: The non-indigent is still faced 
with that same balancing question. How much is it going to cost 
me and what are my chances of success. 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: That would be a good indicator. You're 
right. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Gampell, can you get that for 
us, the rate of affirmance in the non-indigent criminal appeals 
for a shot of time? Thnnk you. 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: I can just tell you right now it will be 
tough for him to get this for the past. He may get it in the 
future if he tells the clerks to send ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I understand. He'd have to do a 
shot in time like he's done before on other issues. You know 
just take a picture of six weeks ... 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: That's right. As was pointed out 
earlier, the reversal rate, I don't have that for civil cases. I 
couldn't find it anywhere. In criminal cases, as was mentioned, 
it's about 11 percent reversal. There is a modification rate, 
too, that's about another 16 percent which, I think, as you 
indicated, is a passing phase. That will be cleared up in a year 
or two when trial judges learn the rules and maybe you clear up 
some of the legislation, but the reversal rate is fairly small. 
Another interesting statistic is the percentage of appellate 
opinions that are published. About 25 percent of the civil cases 
end up jn published opinions which means the judges think they're 
pretty important. The figure for criminal cases is only 9 
percent, very low. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Doesn't that vary district by 
district? I've been given to understand that some districts will 
have a tremendously higher publication rate and other districts 
have a considerably lower one. 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: That's true of everything I'm telling 
you. All of these figures will vary by district, but the 
over-all rate is much different between civil and criminal. I 
got some cost figures for you too. You just heard some estimates 
from the A.G. The figures I got were for the representing the 
indigent defendant. The State Public Defender's costs are about 
$2800 a case, although they only handle about 37 percent of the 
cases. The rest are private attorneys under appointment by the 
court of appeals and the cost there is only about $750 because 
they don't pay them very well. The A.G. 's costs are about $2100 
and the ..• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why couldn't all of them be done by 
appointment? 
M.R. MOSKOVITZ: Well, I' 11 leave that to you. You're 
the ones that set up the State Public Defender and thought it was 
a good idea. I happen to also because they do such a good job. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But they're going- to be under 
restrictions like everybody else, and if there's a more efficient 
way of doing it, then it seems to me that, in other words, as far 
as you know there's no bar to having- it done by outside counsel. 
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MR. MOSKOVITZ 
they don't get a cross 
the toughest cases. 
hardest ones. The 
private Bar too 
is between $6,000 
appeals, the A G 
There's a fourth 
and that is the one 
which is going to 
higher than that. 
to say is wasted 
rate. So, how do 
system someway to 
for himself whether 
have 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Just 
can do a ar 
appeals filed last 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: 
Almost same 
good one, that you 
I'll give you a very 
yourselves decided 
study in 1974 that 
50¢ for a drug pre 
reduces the use of 
really don't need them 
adopted this princ 
and you estimated 
year. 
with 
that 
one. 
point. 
MR. MOSKOVITZ 
ASSEMBLYMAN 
MR. MOSKOVITZ 
defendants? The first 
pay something from 
prisoners do some work 
could contribute a 1 
think. It's not 
Everybody knows that 
about it and do it 
any necessities of 
investigated that, 
4285, something 
cases. The bas 
and that 
of that. It's 
-Cal. 
, I 
Yes, I understand 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me interrupt you one minute. 
mentioned a figure of six to eight thousand dollars as be 
cost to appeal. How did you calculate that? 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: I did it in a simplistic way. 
the total appellate court budget and divided it by the 
opinions and I cam out with a figure of I think $2,300, 
my report, per published decision which is rough but that's 
best I could do. For the State Public Defender, I simply cal 
up their administrator and he told me it was $2,800, the A.G. 
same thing, $2,100. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: The reason I was asking is that I 
trying to make sure that the judge's time has been calculated 
and so on and so forth and I think that certainly the way you 
have done it is one way to do it. 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: I just took their total budget and 
divided it by the number of opinions, that's all. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: But the production of the 
the deputy district attorney time, you know a lot of time 
are not here to pay you .•• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I think the number is low because 
was coming up with the figure of 40 to 50 million dollars and 
seemed to me that it was probably much more. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Right, so just adding those 
components is significRnt. I mean, there's time for that 
district attorney that tried the case to spend with the 
attorney general that's going to handle the appeal .•• 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: I didn't count that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I know but those are signif 
costs that are still being paid by the same taxpayer. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Gampell. 
MR. GAMPELL: If _:rou' re thinking of 40 or 50 mill 
the budget, 25 million of that is a pass through of the sta 
payment to superior court judges, that component of superior 
court judge's salaries and it has nothing at all to do with 
Supreme Court. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What is your total budget, Mr. 
for the appellate courts? 
MR. GAMPELL: Between 20 and 25 million. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That is strictly the .•. 
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MR. GAMPELL: Court of Appeal and Supreme Court but 
that's for every aspect. 
MR Well, my idea, as 
make them pay a out of prison 
turned out it just didn't work because only 
prisoners have jobs. are des le 
based a lot on seniority so you've got to be 
you get a job and when the convicted defendant has to 
whether to appeal, he's not going to have a job yet. 
take him a year or so to get a job so that doesn't 
I thought of this idea of, as you put it, giving them some money 
and then, I didn't say $500, I said $200, and he 
money ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Fifty cents will 
a lot of political trouble. Can you see our col 
give Sirhan Sirhan $50 or much less $200? I mean 
real perception problem. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: A psychological, 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Or the Eastside st 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: I know. I have some ways of 
that I think. First of all, if you ... 
ASSEMBLY~~N ROBINSON: We wouldn't need 
if that would pass. 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: There's about 11,000 prisoners 
corning in. I propose giving each of them $200 which 
forfeit if they want to appeal. I figured out that if this 
influences 10 percent of them not to appeal, whi 
figure, the state's going to save 1.3 million lars 
you influence 50 percent of them, you save over 12 
dollars a year, so one response to your constituents i 
have this tremendous savings ultimately to them 's 
times this $200. At $500 it wouldn't work out as well. 
not only for the political reason you mentioned but 
give $500 to a lot of people who wouldn't appeal anyway 
break even point becomes -- you'd have to inf 
them. The only reason I put $500 in My proposal was 
my proposal out to a lot of judges and lawyers for 
it was mostly very favorable. Everybody thought it was 
idea to try it out, not to impose it statewide jus 
out, which is all I am recommending to you as a 
One of the comments that I got from a couple 
was $200 isn't enough to luence these guys. You're 
have to go a little higher than that these days and I'm 
I agree with that. I th any amount that makes the man 
down with his lawyer and talk about it and think 
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enough to of meritless appeals even if 
$100. So what the test project is to 
inmates picked , divide them into five groups 
give one 400 , 3, 2 and 1 and then 
a aga a 
0 new 
and you 
do this 
nothing and See if the rates of 
appeals any of the groups, if rate 
is dif groups and try it out. Now, you 
could add on some test some time off instead of money if 
you wanted. My initial reaction th<'l.t giving time f doing 
this is a bad idea. I ... 
ASSEMBLY~~N ROBINSON: My proposition is they already 
get time policy established SB 42 
order to isoners control in prisons 
they will get time off, I believe it's 20 percent, the staff can 
correct me, of the time sentence they get off. Okay, what I was 
suggesting is that the time that they would otherwise be entitled 
to, the filing of a frivolous appeal would be the same as setting 
your mattress on f and therefore you would lose so many months 
of good time. That I believe is considerably more palatable 
because going of money, I'm , I mean 
you're a 're a professional in s f , I 
assure you if polled 1 practitioner or the lawyer in 
Orange County who handles a percentage of criminal cases but is 
not a criminal appel specialist and asked them what they 
think of $50 bounty to all the prisoners and I've got a good mix 
of Republicans and Democrats, mostly Republican in my county, 
they will tell me I'm and then as I jokingly said to Mr. 
Imbrecht, but is absolutely true given the competitive nature of 
the jobs that all of us hold both in the Senate and the Assembly, 
that no matter how well intended we'd only be able to convince a 
few CPA's and a few criminal appellate attorneys that what we 
were doing made economic sense, that we were in saving the 
taxpayers else would believe that we were 
getting would be those 
that were stupid the bill 
to vote for plan. 
11, I'll tell you I, a I I sent 
this out , .. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Mr. Robinson as an 
in campaign 
'm sure he's more am on 
that 
ASSEMBLY.M_AN IMBRECHT: He knows exactly as I do I 
can perceive how that thing would be phrased and we're not just 
pursuing -- one concern as I sit here and about 
the $100, I mean I m to put my own mental state the 
shoes of a state prison. What s 
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commissary privileges, I unders 
sort of thing but not much 
mental attitude would 
gambling $500 versus 
long shot. The 
commissary or 
versus even an outside 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: people in the system 
that's not right. It might be right at a very low 
fact these commissary privileges are very important 
prisoners. They don't to take soap 
by the syste~, or the c s. They can 
stuff, small radios, and if 
long it's going to earn the 20 
takes to get a small transistor radio at 
hour, that's hundreds of hours. $200, I 
into almost a year of work at five 
could influence a lot 
take your year's worth of 
you instead of this worthless 
proposing we go ahead and s 
bucks isn't enough, we to go 
view that 200 is enough. Let's an experiment, 
of different figures and see what we get. The t 
here's what bothered me and that is you compared it to 
setting his mattress on re. If he sets his mattre s 
he's shown that he's not rehabilitated and shouldn t 
good time off and shouldn't go out on streets 
things related to good things that re 
rehabilitation whereas your appeal 
with that. You really are, in , making 
time because ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You have to 
the time the Legislature our 
the Penal Code we made a 
interested in rehabil 
systems are exactly that, , 
will have fixed and and 
statement made at the time SB 42 was adopted 
suggesting would be consistent with that pol 
MR. NOSKOVITZ: 
word but the factors that 
whether the person 
is different. Now I don t 
feel. .. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON 
harebrained idea, if there are 
it. 
No, this is an 
lems with 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: It certainly 
mind, worth exploring. My thing about good 
suggesting that as anv kind of automatic. That 
a decision of the court ... 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: As 
nothing wrong with putting 
time. 
as 
CHAIID'T..AN HARRIS: Mr. Moskovitz, I think we 
certainly the spirit of your ideas on the question of 
disincentives and incentives we do want to explore 
closely and we appreciate your on-going cooperation 
with our staff relative to finding out what, in 
and also for our own 1 s what is going to 
salable. We can educate our communities but also 
all of the ramifications of any of the proposals we 
consider. Is there anything you'd like to add to your 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: No, I think I've pretty well 
One thing I would add is that I thought it was rather 
that it took in a way someone like me on the outs of 
government, I'm the head of the State Housing Commiss 
another field, but in the criminal area I'm outs of 
government, and nobody in government was looking toward 
of thing and I had to, as I said, pull some strings to 
of this information. No one was trying to look at the 
picture. Each segment of government was looking at 
problems. I did get a negative reaction from the 
Corrections that said pretty much if we go along 
we're going to qet attacked by a lot of prison groups 
sure that's true but who is looking at the big picture 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We are. That's why we're 
hearing. 
!-1R. MOSKOVITZ: 's why I'm here. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I appreciate that also 
understand that to a certain extent it has been a 
kind of a situation where we've looked at Correction , 
looked at the judiciary, we've looked to everybody and 
are you doing, what's the Governor proposinq, et cetera 
quite frankly, nothing was forthcoming but perhaps 
because of economic realities. Maybe that's one of 
realities of Proposition 13. It is forcing us to 
we do business and decide what our priorities are 
whether or not there's a better way to do business. 
Mr. Moskovitz. 
MR. MOSKOVITZ: All right. If you need me, 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We will. \·Je' 11 be in touch and the 
staff certainly will be ta to you. 
Our next witness is Mr. Henry Mann who is with the 
1 Research D the San Diego s 
ice and who is the California Distr 
Association. 
MR. HENRY rffiNN: Thank you, Assemblyman. My name is 
Henry Mann. I'm with the San Diego County District Attorney's 
Office. I'll make very brief remarks. District attorneys 
historicalJy have not been involved in the appellate process. We 
generally get involved with the pre-trial writs and when the 
people appeal. The three areas that we see in our limited 
experience, however, the major area that we see that could 
corrected is to push the appellate rights of the defendant. 
I have three examples I think which will lay this out. 
Under Section 1538.5 of the Penal Code, subdivision I, the 
defendant has a right a brings his motion into the 
superior court to take a writ to the court of appeal and then 
subsequently to the Supreme Court. After a plea of guilty or a 
finding of guilt by the court or jury trial, he can also appeal 
this if there's been no definitive decision by the court of 
appeal before. We think that this particular area here could be 
eliminated, that is the pre-trial writ. I notice Justice 
Christian said that it didn't bother him very much. However, 
Justice Staniforth in discussing his writ procedures said three 
justices have to review t.hat. Now the defendant les a 
petition. We are normal required to file a response which is 
loaded with facts and laws that somebody has to review. And we 
generally have two of those at any one time in our office each 
week. Now if you can multiply that by the amount in the Los 
Angeles I would believe that is somewhat significant and wou 
holding down the justices in looking at the appeals. 
Another area is dealing with matters be the 
preliminary hearing in felonies. We've had a lot of situations 
in which t.he defense attorneys <1re unhappy with, for example, a 
discovery motion prior to preliminary examination. They then 
take an extraordinary writ to the superior court and then 
from superior court if they're not satisfied to the court of 
appeal and then subsequently to the SupreMe Court. We think 
that is an abuse because all of those errors can be tested later 
on appeal from conviction. They don't need to be contested 
obviously if the defendant is acquitted. And we think that one 
of the more gross abuses deals with misdemeanor cases and 
touched on a little bit by a previous witness. In a mi 
case, if a defendant is not happy with some action of the court, 
whether be justice court or municipal court, they take a wr 
again to the superior court and again if they lose there they 
have the right to take the on to the court of appeal. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: But it's much, much lower than 
what the current price of money is for commercial markets and 
that's ... 
MR. CYRIL: The point I was trying to address is ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: I'm not thinking of interest as a 
penalty to be imposed and it's hard for me to see it being fair 
characterized under those circumstances, in that context. 
MR. CYRIL: The point I was trying to address is should 
interest rates be increased to create disincentives for appeals 
that shouldn't be filed, I say to you that maybe the interest 
rates ought to be increased because of the economic climate, for 
historical reasons, for •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: The question is, the real 
question is, do the low current interest rates create an 
incentive for appeal? I'm not suggesting we raise interest rates 
to create a disincentive necessarily, but to eliminate what may 
be the circumstance today which there maybe is in effect an 
actual incentive. The cost of money is 21 or 22 percent and 
we're only charging 10 percent interest on judgments. That's a 
pretty substantial contrast. 
MR. CYRIL: As a practitioner I can tell you truthfully 
I don't see that as a factor coming up in my cases and that's all 
I can tell you. 
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Judge Christian testified to us 
earlier that he sits in settlements of appeals where he is 
convinced that's the factor, where there's a substantial judgment 
that's been rendered of a million dollars or more against an 
institutional client. 
MR. CYRIL: I guess just depends on how you see this 
but I certainly don't. My members of my organization ... 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: I certainly appreciate the offer of 
assistance and advice from your organization. I hope you have a 
sense that we are serious about doing something about our 
appellate process in California if for no other reason than ... 
MR. CYRIL: Right. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: And we would like to have your 
participation so that we're not doing something that's haphazard, 
something that's not going to be workable. If there are other 
specific recommendations that you would care to offer after 
deliberations with your colleagues and your association, we would 
be more than happy to receive them and we certainly would 
appreciate your on-going advice and cooperation as that proceeds. 
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MR. CYRIL: Thank We're glad to 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: If there are no 
hearing will be adjourned and we thank all 
your participation and 
continued efforts on 
# # # # # # 
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:tu~idaru 
ELIHU M. HARRIS 
CHAIRMAN 
TO: All Members of the Assembly Judiciary and 
Criminal Justice Committees 
FROM: Geoff Goodman, Rubin Lopez, and Ray LeBov 
SUBJECT: Interim Hearing on Appellate Court Efficiency 
DATE: October 6, 1981 
On October 15, 1981, the Assembly Judiciary and 
COUNSEL 
Justice Committees will hold a joint hearing in San Diego on Court 
of Appeal efficiency. The hearing is scheduled to begin at 10:0 
in Room 310 of the County Administration Building, 1600 Pacif 
Highway, San Diego, California. 
Members of the staffs of both Committees have sol 
testimony from Justices of the Appellate Court, appellate 
and other experts. The witnesses were requested to present 
which identifies problems, if any, in appellate court structure 
administration and practices as well as proposals for improving 
appellate court efficiency. In particular, witnesses were 
focus on addressing the following issues: 
1. Identification the nature, extent, and cause 
of problems, if any, relating to volume and 
in California Courts of Appeal. For example: 
What is 
civil appel 
impact of criminal appeals on 
calendaring? 
How does the current appeal court structure 
including the existence of multiple divis 
within districts, affect judicial efficiency? 
Do available statistics indicate the existence 
of substantial problems in delay or 
in the 1 courts? 
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2. Identification and evaluation of 
used 
What is the of the 
pre-hearing settlement conferences 
First and Third Appellate Districts 
What results can be anticipated from the 
Judicial Council's circuit riding 
3. Further 
efficiency. 
for improving 
For example: 
Would limiting or restricting appealable 
be a reasonable approach to curing volume 
delay problems? 
How does the use of legal research 
affect appellate caseload? Does the 
central staff attorneys result in 
productivity? 
INCREASED WORKLOAD 
Over the past two decades, ap?ellate courts 
the country have experienced a dramatic increase 
reasons have been given for the expansion of appellate 
exploding population, increased urbanization, the 
the rights of prisoners, criminal defendants and consumers 
tendency of many segments of society to rely on the courts 
social problems. 
California's Courts of Appeal, like 
elsewhere in the United States, have experienced pers 
in caseloads. The following tables illustrate this 
comparing workload, disposition by written opinion, and 
at five-year intervals from 1964-1965 through 1979-1980.* 
*"Report of the Chief Justice's Special 
Appellate Practices and Procedures in the First 
April 21, 1981, p. 9. 
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CIVIL AND CRIMINAL APPEALS FILED 
First Third Fourth Fifth 
r Dist. Dist. Dist. 
-·--- ---
1964-65 659 1,304 240 401 118 
1969-70 1,:'.36 2,089 370 725 223 4,543 
1974-75 1,571 2,374 596 1,000 374 5,915 
1979-80 2,276 3,153 931 1,641 833 8,835 
Average Annual Increase, 1969-70 to 1979-80 (Approximate 
7% 3 1/2% 10% 8 1/2% 14 1/2% 
DISPOSITIONS OF APPEALS fu~D ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS 
BY \\TRITTEN OPINIO:-;', TOTAL AN'D PER JUDGE* 
First Second Third Fourth Fifth 
Dist. Dist. Dist. Dist. Dist. 
---Per Per Per Per Per 
Total Judge Total Judge Total Judge Total Judge Total Judge 
446 51.8 890 74.2 140 46.7 216 72.0 123 41.0 
69-70 769 64.1 1,590 79 5 232 58.0 437 48.6 175 58.0 
1,527 99.2* 2,347 103.8* 516 81.9* 851 97.8* 330 86.8* 5,5 
1979-80 1, 712 100.0* 2,377 105.2* 664 83.0* 1, 350 124.4* 556 109.0* 6, 
Also see the qraphs attached as Exhibits 1-5. These 
graphs are in "semi-log" s~ale so that equal vertical distances 
represent equal percentages of change, and a constant percent of 
change produces a "straight line" slope, regardless of the size 
of the number. 
PROPOSED CHANGES 
The traditional answer to increasing appellate caseloads 
has been to increase the number of appellate judges. This 
has not always been possible and according to some writers, not 
sfactory. (See Goldman, , "The Appellate Settlement 
ence an Effective Procedural Reform," State Court Journal, Vol . 
. 1, Winter 1978, pp. 3-5). 
*Per authorized judge for 1964-1965 and 1969-1970; 
udge-equivalent (not available for 1964-1965 or 1969-1970) for 
974-1975 and 1979-1980 to take into account assigned j 
extended absence and vacancies in office. 
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Recently the Special Committee on Appellate Practices and 
Procedures in the First Appellate District submitted its final 
report. (A copy of the Summary of the Report is attached as 
Exhibit 6). The Report contained six specific findings: 
1. Appellate caseload is growing steadily. 
2. Such techniques as the use of central staff for 
dealing with increased appellate caseload without 
a corresponding increase in judgships have facili-
tated the work of the courts, but have created some 
appearance of diminished judicial control over the 
appellate decision-making process, and have reached 
the limit of their effectiveness . 
3. Appellate caseloads per judge are already excessive. 
4. It does not now appear to be necessary or practical 
to make any material change in the law providing 
for the right to appeal. 
5. Some measures to discourage appeals taken solely 
for the purpose of delay would be appropriate. 
6. Some measures can be taken to speed appeals without 
sacrificing the quality of the decisionmaking process. 
The Special Committee also made 18 separate recommendations 
regarding methods of handling increased appellate caseloads. Those 
recommendations are included in Exhibit 6 to provide an overview of 
the broad range of proposals in this area. 
What follows is background material on some specific 
issues expanded use of pre-hearing settlement conferences, the 
use of professional and centralized staff, and restrictions on 
criminal appeals. 
PREHEARING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 
The Prehearing Settlement Conference (PHSC) is a relatively 
recent innovation designed to reduce appellate court judges' workload 
and to expand their available time by encouraging settlement. Although 
the specific operation of PHSC's differ from court to court, there 
are several elements common to the innovative procedure. Opposing 
counsel meets with a judge or, in a few courts, with a staff attorney 
who through various procedures seeks to encourage or arrange settle-
ment of the case. The proceeding is confidential. If settlement is 
not reached, the judges hearing the appeal have no knowledge of what 
was said in conference. The conference mediator (i.e., the judge or 
staff attorney) is not involved in the later substantive consideration 
of the appeal. Approximately 12 state appellate courts have imple-
mented some form of PHSC procedure. 
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The major benefits from a PHSC program are that it may 
lessen the number of appeals that require consideration by our 
appellate court and permit a narrowing of issues prior to hearing. 
However, there are some potential drawbacks that must be recognized. 
Critics suggest that the time spent by mediators could be better 
spent hearing and deciding cases under normal processes. Some 
critics suggest that preparation for settlement conferences delays 
the normal process (e.g., the preparation of transcripts may be 
delayed pending a settlement conference). Further, critics suggest 
that the time and expense required by PHSC programs simply do not 
justify the effort of implementation. 
In California, the First, Second and Third Appellate Court 
Districts have settlement conference programs. Rule 19.5, California 
Rules of Court, permits presiding appellate justices to order appel-
lants to file a short statement of the nature of the case and the 
issues on appeal after the notice of appeal had been filed and to 
order all counsel to attend a prehearing settlement conference. 
Each district is permitted, by local rule, to establish their own 
program to meet local needs. For example, in the First Appellate 
District, counsel are ordered to appear at a PHSC in all cases that 
are subject to the program (the program excludes juvenile and 
in pro per cases). However, parties are allowed to "opt out" of the 
program if they think settlement would not be useful. The PHSC 
program in the Second District is completely voluntary and parties 
must agree to participate in the program before the case is arraigned 
to a settlement judge and a conference date set. The Third Appellate 
District's program is mandatory. If any party accepts an invitation 
to participate, regardless of the desire of other parties, the case 
is submitted to the conference program. If no party accepts a 
settlement, the judge decides after briefly reviewing statements 
proposed by the parties, whether to order a conference. 
Statistical data on the success of the California program 
is incomplete. Nevertheless, the Third District strongly advocates 
PHSC's expanded use and has published the following data:** 
**See Janes, Betram, George E. Paras, Anita Rue Shapiro, 
"The Appellate Settlement Conference Program in Sacramento," 
California State Bar Journal, (Vol. 56, No. 3, March 1981, p. 112). 
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trial period 
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1977 
1978 
1979··· 
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Conferences and Settlements in Qvil Appeals 
at the California Court of Appeal, Sacramento 
Civil Appeals Settlement Conferences 
156 66(42%)•. 
316 134(42%) 
387 92 (24%) 
439 194(44%) 
439 295 (67%) 
Cases Settiect 
36(55%) ... 
72(54%) 
54(59%) 
105(54%) 
147(50%) 
1980 530 363 (68%) 134 (49%);. ... 
·~rcentage of civil appeals in which settlement conferences were held 
• ·~rcentage of settlement conference cases that settled. 
• • "No statistics are available for 1979. 
• • • "The number of settlement conference cases that have settled thus far, and the percentage of all non pending settlement 
conference cases that have settled. -
Gvil Appeals Dismissed." 
California Court of Appeal 
Statewide•• Sacramento 
Fiscal Year 
1972-1973 
1973-1974 
1974-1975 
1975-1976 
1976-1977 
1977-1978 
1978-1979 
1979····· 
1980 ....... 
Civil Appeals 
2014 
2116 
2380 
2837 
2883 
3064 
3219 
• After the record was perfected. 
""Except Sacramento. 
Dismissed 
430 (21%)••• 
400(19%) 
489 (21%) 
668 (24%). 
825(29%) 
785(26%) 
8?7 (27%) 
. Civil Appeals 
263 
264 
306 
346 
400 
454 
443 
515 
530. 
"""Ptrcentagt- of statewide (except Sacramento) civil appeals dismissed. after the record was perfected 
• • • • ~rcentage of Sacramento civil appeals dismissed. after the record was perfected 
•,. • • •No statewide statistics are available at this time. 
CENTRALIZED AND PROFESSIONAL STAFF 
DismiSsed . 
32(12%) ........ 
43(16%) 
88 (29%) 
121 (35%) 
138(35%) 
211 (46%) 
176 (40%) 
210 (41%) 
247 (47%) 
Another controversial aspect of appellate court procedure 
is the role and function of the courts' staff attorneys (i.e., 
attorneys assigned to particular individual justices, writ attorneys 
and central staff attorneys). There is a sharp division of opinion 
as to precisely what functions the courts' staff should perform. 
It is generally agreed that legal staff can help increase a court's 
productivity. However, some commentators have observed that such a 
staff, particularly a central court staff (i.e., staff serving the 
court as a whole) may fulfill what is more properly a judicial 
function and have undue influence in the deciding of cases. This 
function is believed to be most likely to occur when the ratio of 
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is too 
the Courts has 
two levels of 
of fresh 
The of Appeal adopted a f 
plan conceived of at that , the role of 
central staff cases deemed 'routine,' and after 
appropriate research prepare comprehensive memoranda and 
opinions in those The staff memorandum and draft 
submitted to a the Court which assumes responsibility 
approving the staff , referring it back for further work, or (at 
the request of any of the three judges) assigning the case to a 
member of the panel for conventional treatment."* This diversion 
of "routine" cases to central staff is intended to reserve more 
judicial time for cases involving substantive issues. However, it 
has been criticized usurpation of a judicial function by 
non-judicial personnel. While conceding that the expanded role of 
the legal staff is convenient and may increase judicial productivity, 
some commentators argue that the cost is too great: i.e., the quality 
of justice rendered fers and the public acceptance of the court's 
opinions is diminished. 
Other experts, such as Bernard Witkin, disagree. They argue 
that the volume of. late cases is so great that an expert pro-
fessional research is crucial to judicial efficiency and that 
the court does not actually delegate judicial functions. The authority 
to decide cases remains with the justices, only the task of stating 
the reasons for dec is delegated and the products are "carefully 
considered decisions that follow the controlling statutory and 
decisional law."** 
ISSUES CONCERNING APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES 
Proposals relating to criminal cases generally aim at the 
perceived problem that there are too many meritless appeals. Several 
approaches to this problem may be raised at the hearing: 
1. Expedited Handling. Some have proposed that the 
court be permitted to dispense with full written 
opinions in cases which raise no valid issues. 
It is that oral opinions from the bench or 
*"Report of the Chief Justice's Special Committee on 
Appellate Practices and Procedures in the First Appellate District," 
April 21, 1981, p. 15. 
**"Witkin on Appellate Court Attorneys," California State 
Bar Journal, March/April 1979. 
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PAGE 8 
summary affirmances by written memorandum could 
save substantial court time. The State Constitution 
currently requires a written opinion with the 
reasons stated (Art. VI, Sec. 14). Opponents of 
this approach express concern that the quality of 
decision-making might suffer if a written opinion 
were not required. They also question whether a 
significant amount of judicial time would be saved. 
2. Screening Appeals. Another approach is to limit the 
number of appeals by screening which cases may be 
appealed. One Attorney General sponsored bill 
(SB 1197, Doolittle) would have required the trial 
court to decide whether or not a case raised 
sufficient issues to justify an appeal. The Judiciary 
Committee has not yet taken action on the bill. A 
copy of the Committee's analysis is attached (Exhibit 7). 
3. Discouraging Appeals by Indigents. Professor Myron 
Moskovitz has suggested an unusual approach that 
seeks to discourage indigent defendants from filing 
meritless appeals. Under his proposal, an indigent 
would be credited with a certain sum of money. If he 
appealed, the money would go toward the costs of 
appeal. If he did not appeal, the money could be 
used by the inmate for expenses in prison. A copy 
GG/RL/RL:df 
Attachments 
of his proposal is attached (Exhibit 8). The attach-
ment includes a compilation of relevant statistics. 
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EXHIBIT 5 
FIFTH 
APPELLATE 
DISTRICT 
EXHIBIT B EXHIBIT 6 
REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S SPECIJI..L COMMITTEE 
ON APPELLA'I'E PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 
IN THE FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
SUMMARY 
A. The special committee finds: 
1. Appellate caseload is growing steadily. 
2. Such techniques as the use of central staff 
for dealing with increased appellate caseload without a 
corresponding increase in judgeships have facilitated the 
work of the courts, but have created some appearance of 
diminished judicial control over the appellate decision-
making process, and have reached the limit of their 
effectiveness. 
3. Appellate caseloads per judge are already 
excessive. 
4. It does not now appear to be necessary or 
practical to make any material change in the law providing 
for the right to appeal. · 
5. Some measures to discourage appeals taken 
solely for the purpose of delay would be appropriate. 
6. Some measures can be taken to speed appeals 
without sacrificing the quality of the decision-making 
process. 
B. For reAsons discussed in the full report, the special 
comnuttee therefor-e reconm1ends that: 
,.,-··· 
1. New court of Appeal judgeships should be 
created over the next several years so as to reduce the work-
load per judge to an average of 75 to 85 majority opinions 
per year. The Legislature should immediately add at least 
four judgeships for the First Appellate District. 
2. If workload is· reduced to the level suggested 
1 -87-
.in (1}, the Courts of Appeal should consider mandatory court 
decision conference s which will assure an oral 
three-judge discuss 
opinion. 
3. 
sufficiently in advance of 
tion to counsel of 
wishes discussed at 
4. There 
neys available per judge. 
one attorney per two judges. 
case ior to filing of an 
conferences should be held 
argument to permit notifica-
court particularly 
two personal research attar-
staff should not exceed 
5. A rule should be adopted requiring conform-
ance with the general of naming, in a footnote to 
the opinion, the judges ipated in the decision of 
a "by the court" case. 
6. Legislation should set postjudgment interest 
rates in civil cases to maximum allowed under the state 
Constitution. 
7. Legis provide for the automatic 
award, as costs to the party in a civil appeal, of 
attorneys' fees of not less than $500 and not more than $1,500. 
8. The time to appeal in criminal cases should be 
reduced from 60 to 30 days. 
9. Transcript preparation in criminal cases should 
begin, automatically, upon conviction after trial (unless other-
wise ordered) , and upon conviction based on a plea if ordered 
by the trial court. 
10. In cr 
that the record on appeal 
oral instructions, and 
ings under section 1538. 
transcript should inc 
written instructions. 
1 s, the rules should provide 
include closing arguments, 
in suppression hear-
Penal Code; and the clerk's 
trial motions and 
11 •. The use of computer-aided transcription should 
be expanded. There should limited experiment in producing 
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_transcript from sound recordings. The Judicial Council should 
review means of assigning cour~ reporters in trial courts so 
as to reduce delays in prepa~ing reporters' transcripts on 
appeal. 
12. A 50-page limit should be imposed on briefs, 
regardless of the method of preparation (with longer briefs 
permitted on special application). Briefs should be re-
quired to give page references to the record indicating 
where points on appeal were preserved. 
13. Each Court of Appeal should adopt a strict 
polic~t on extension of time for filing briefs and apply the 
policy uniformly. In civil cases, the parties should not be 
permitted to stipulate (without court approval) for exten-
sions c:>f more than 30 days for the filing of briefs. 
14. Each Court of Appeal should develop proce-
dures to identify defective briefs as soon as possible. after 
filing, and in any event, before the case is placed on 
calendar. 
15. The First Appellate District sh9.uld have a 
properly located law library staffed by a full-time pro-
fessional law librarian. 
16. A Rule of Professional Conduct should be con-
sidered to require counsel on appeal to notify their clients 
of the Court of Appeal decision and of the deadline for seek-
ing a hearing in the Supreme Court. 
17. Each court's procedures for handling emer-
gency writ applications should be publicized. 
18. Rule l4(b) should be amended to clarify the 
procedure and criteria governing amicus curiae briefs. 
EXHIBIT 7 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 1981-82 Regular Session 
SB 1197 (Doolittle) 
As introduced 
Penal Code 
JGD 
CRIMINAL APPEALS 
-CERTIFICATION OF MERIT-
HISTORY 
Source: Attorney General 
Prior Legislation: None 
Support: Unknown 
Opposition: State Public Defender 
KEY ISSUE 
SHOULD APPEAL AFTER CONVICTION BE CONDITIONED ON A 
CERTIFICATION OF MERIT FROM THE TRIAL COURT? 
PURPOSE 
Existing law authorizes every defendant convicted of 
a criminal offense to appeal as a matter of right. 
This bill would condition appeal on certification by 
the trial judge that the defendant has raised an 
issue or issues that may necessitate reversal of 
the conviction. 
The purpose of the bill is to attempt to reduce the 
volume of criminal appeals. 
(More) 
s 
B 
1 
1 
9 
7 
SB 1197 (Doolittle) 
Page Two 
COMMENT 
1. Certification procedure 
(a) Appeals from guilty plea 
Existing law limits the right of appeal of 
an offender who pleads guilty to only those 
cases wherein a judge files a certificate 
of probable cause with the county clerk, 
based on the defendant having shown "reasonable 
grounds" for the appeal (P.C. Sec. 1237.5). 
This bill would establish an even stricter 
test for defendants who consistently main-
tained their innocence. 
IS THIS THE AUTHOR'S INTENT? 
J 
(b) Self-criticism for trial judges 
• 
This bill requires the defendant to convince 
the trial judge to certify the case for 
appeal, unless the trial judge was not 
available. 
In most cases appeals are predicated upon 
one. form or another of judicial error. 
This bill would therefore require that a 
defendant convince the trial judge he or 
she may have erred in order to be granted 
an appeal. Moreover, this bill would 
require that a judge certify not only 
that he or she may arguably have erred, 
but that the error might not have been 
harmless and could therefore result in 
reversal on appeal. 
IS IT REALISTIC TO EXPECT TRIAL JUDGES TO 
INVITE REVERSAL OF THEIR DECISIONS? 
(More) 
-91-
s 
B 
1 
1 
9 
7 
SB 1197 (Doo ttle 
Page Three 
IF A 'I'RIAL 
SPOULD I'!' "'1()'1" 
NEW TRIAL? 
TO MAKE SUCH A FINDING 
MOST CASES SIMPLY GRANT A 
(c) Non-appealability of certification denial 
The trial court 
only be 
of Appeal. 
Appeal a 
Supreme Court. 
order denying appeal would 
writ to the Court 
by the Court of 
not be taken to the 
2. More complicated than present procedure 
Proponents contend 
by this bill would 
criminal appeals, 
time and resources. 
looked, however the 
on trial courts. 
the procedure established 
the number of frivolous 
saving appellate court 
apparently over-
this bill would have 
In addition, and to, a motion for new 
trial this bill wnul re, in effect, that 
the appeal be made trial court. All 
issues that would normal be considered on 
appeal would first have to be argued before the 
trial judge, whc would not only have to rule on 
their probable , but on whether or not 
any alleged errors were or were not harmless in 
terms of impact on the verdict. Such determina-
tions waul~ require briefing by the parties, 
complete with references to the record, and, 
finally, t>ral 
SHOULD T1(IAL JUDGES 
TIME AND RESOURCES 
Only afUer the tri 
would the defendant 
for writ: of 
RED TO SPEND THEIR 
APPELLATE ARGUMENTS? 
had denied certification 
able to make application 
appellate court. 
(More') 
s 
B 
1 
1 
9 
7 
SB 1197 (Doolittle) 
Page Four 
SHOULD A TWO-STEP PROCEDURE (MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL AND APPEAL) BE REPLACED BY A FOURT-STEP 
PROCEDURE (MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, APPLICATION 
FOR CERTIFICATION, APPLICATION FOR WRIT, AND 
APPEAL) IN THE NAME OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY? 
3. Alternative approach 
Another way of accomplishing the goal of making 
appeals discretionary without at the same time 
institutionalizing an unwieldy certification 
procedure would be to institute certiorari review, 
whereby the Court of Appeal would be given 
authority to deny applications for appeal after 
reviewing an applicant's written arguments. 
WOULD THIS NOT BE A SIMPLER, MORE EFFECTIVE 
METHOD OF INSTITUTING DISCRETIONARY REVIEW? 
********** 
-93-
s 
B 
1 
1 
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SENATE 
An act to 
and 1237.4 
SB 1197, as 
Under 
judgment of 
the defendant 
unless the 
for the appeaL 
This bill 
judgment of 
the court 
The bill would 
or deny the 
Vote: 
The 
1 SECTION 
2 amended 
3 1237. 
4 an appeal 
5 1. From a 
6 provided 
7 probation, 
8 insanity, 
9 defendant 
10 deemed to 
11 section. 
EXHIBIT C 
cause 
is 
99 40 
• 
SB 1197 -2-
1 addiction shall be deemed to be a final judgment within 1 
2 the meaning of this section 90 days after such 
3 commitment. Upon appeal from a final judgment the 
4 court may review any order denying a motion for a new 
5 trial. 
6 2. From any order made after judgment, affecting the 
7 substantial rights of the party. 
8 SEC. 2. Section 1237.3 is added to the Penal Code, to 
9 read: 
10 1237.3. Notwithstanding Section 1237, no appeal may 
11 be taken without first securing a certificate of appeal 
12 from the court before which the matter was heard as 
13 prescribed in Section 1237.4. 
14 SEC. 3. Section 1237.4 is added to the Penal Code, to 
15 read: 
16 1237.4. (a) No appeal may be taken by the defendant 
17 under Section 1237 without first securing a certificate of 
18 appeal from the court before which the matter was 
19 heard. The certificate may only be granted upon 
20 application by the prospective appellant filed within 60 ( 
21 days of the courfs judgment, or date of entry of the order 
22 appealed from. The application shall set forth with 
23 particularity all errors of law asserted to have been 
24 committed by the trial court and all issues of law and fact 
25 to be raised on appeal. 
26 (b) The application for certificate of appeal shall be 
27 determined by the judge who presided at the trial; 
28 provided, however, that in case of the inability of that 
29 judge to determine the application the same shall be 
30 determined by any other judge of the same court. 
31 (c) The application shall be granted if it raises 
32 arguable issues of law which, if determined meritorious 
33 by the court of appeal, could necessitate reversal or 
34 modification of the judgment. 
35 (d) An order granting the certificate of appeal shall 
36 not be an appealable order and shall not be otherwise 
37 subject to review by the court of appeal or supreme court. 
38 The denial of an application may be reviewed only if the 
39 application was timely filed and then only in the court of 
40 appeal by writ of mandate filed within 30 days of the ' 
99 60 
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1 denial of 
SB 1197 
appeal. 
9960 
• 
EXHIBIT D 
EXHIBIT 8 
Prooosal for Test and Ev<i1uation of TncPntives to Reduce 
-~ "-----··--·----·~--- ·--------·~-· ~ ---- . --------------------------
the !';umber of Indi nt Criminal Aooeals 
by Myron Moskovitz 
Professor of Law 
Golden Gate University 
San Francisco, California 
July 21, 1981 
GOLDE;\; GATE UNIVERSITY 5.36 :<.fission Street • San francisco • Caliiornia 9~10.') • Telephone (~15) 442·7000 
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I. Suwrnarv of Proposal 
To investigate the possibility of saving the California judicial system 
veral million dollars each year by giving indigent convicted felons a monetary 
incentive not to appeal Y.'hich is similar to the monetary incentive which 
per a tes on non-indigent litigants, Y.'here such appeals are unlikely to succeed. 
-98-
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I The Problem 
I 1963, the United States Supreme Court held that indigent criminal 
defendants h:1ve the right to counsel (paid by the state) on appeal, without 
a preliminary showing that the appeal would be meritorious. 1 
Since then, the number of criminal appeals has increased substantially, 
more than the number of civil appeals. The California Judicial Council 
2 ports the following: 
1959-60 1969-70 1979-80 
Civil Appeals 1, 3 39 1, 981 4,249 
Criminal Appeals 720 2,562 4,586 
Of the 4,586 criminal appeals filed in 1979-80, 4,191 (91.4%) were filed 
. d. 3 1n 1gents. 
The nuwber of cri~inal 3ppeals may be expected to rise even further in 
the next few years, because of the current legislative penchant for increased 
sentences and mandatory state prison terms. 
of these appeals are either completely without merit or are marginal. 
ts 1980 Annual Report (at page 60), the Judicial Council noted that "relatively 
[criminal appeals] are successful." The Court of Appeal wrote opinions 
8 riminal appeals in 1978-79. 77% were affirmances in full. Another 
ffirmances with modifications. Only 11% were reversals. Id. at 
In addition, in 1978-79, only 9% of the criminal appeals resulted 
inions which the Court felt were important enough to publish (as compared 
25% in ivil cases). Id. at page 64. 
_a_s_~_Califo_T_nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
figures appear in the Annual Reports published by the Judicial 
terview with Administrator of State Public Defender's Office, June 
and 18, 1981. 
_qq_ 
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The proble~ has been of sufficient dimension to cause both the United 
4 
ius truct i ng appP.llate counsel 
5 
and the Court of Appeal on how to handle 
~orthless appeals. 
Worthless and marginal criminal appeals impose both monetary and 
nonmonetary costs on at least four major institutions in the judicial 
system. 
Trial Courts 
Almost every time a notice of appral is fi1Pd by :m incHgent crimin<~l 
dt>fvntbnt, both a rt•porter's transcript and a clPrk's tr«nscript must be 
6 
prepared. If the trial has been lengthy, the reporter's transcript can 
be quite expensive, costing several thousand dollars. 
Appellate Courts 
Appellate Courts are expensive. According to the California Judicial 
Council, the total budget for the Courts of Appeal in California for 1979-80 
was $15,443,000, and these courts issued 6,659 written opinions during this 
7 
period. This averages out to $2,319 per written opinion. 
4 
See Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Feggans (1967) 
6 Cal. 2d 444. 
5 
See f_(?~_le v. \\'ende (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 436. 
6 
See California Rules of Court, Rules 35 and 36. 
7 
This figure may be slightly overstated, as it does not take into account 
duties performed by the Courts of Appeal which do not result in written 
opinions--such as revie~ing oetitions for writs of mandate and habeas corpus. 
Nevertheless, these other duties do not take a major part of the Courts' 
time, so the above figure is probably fairly accurate. 
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One might expect this figure to be lower for nonmeritorious appeals, 
sin there are fewer (if any) legal issues to rcvir>w in such cases. But this 
avings in work might be offset by a special burden which the Courts must bear 
in such cases (and no other cases): "to conduct a review of the entire record" 
d . f . lf h h h bl . . 8 to eterm1ne or 1tse wet er t ere are are any argua y meritor1ous 1ssues. 
Nonmeritorious and marginal appeals also have several nonmonetary effects 
appe] late courts: 
e If the increase in such nppeals is faster than the :1ppointment 
of new judges, the rising workload might affect the quality 
of work of the appellate courts. (Mr. Justice Compton of the 
Court of Appeal for the Second District recently noted that 
"there is concern that the quality of justice is being diminished 
by appellate backlog with its attendant delay."lO) 
• Appellate court judges might become skeptical of the merit of all 
indigent appeals. 
8 
v Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441. 
9 Governor Brown's 1981-82 budget proposal states that: "In the past decade, 
increases in the number of judges on the Courts of Appeal have lagged far 
behind the increase in ~he caseloads of those courts. Total filings in the 
Courts of Appeal rose by 847. between 1969-70 and 1979-80; the number of 
increased by only 23%. In 1969-70 there was a total of 48 judges on 
the 5 Courts of Appeal; in 1979-80 the number had grown to 59. In the former 
ea there was an average of 157 filings per judge; by 1979-80 the average had 
r sen to 250." !-os Angeles Dai~ournal, January 13, 1981, page 1. (The 
Governor requested additional annual appropriations of $1,781,550 for 15 more 
:1ppellate judges--plus $1,963,360 for more law clerks. Ibid.) Similar increases 
n filings per judge have been reported in Colorado, New Jersey, Virginia, 
and Oregon. Martin & Prescott, The Problem of Delav in the Colorado 
58 Denver Law Journal 1, 3-4 (1980). 
(1981) 118 Cal. App. 3d 278, 290. 
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• Since criminal cases are given priority on appea1, 11 civil litigants 
may have their cases substantially delayed. According to Mr. Justice 
Christian of the Court of Appeal for the First District, "at the 
present time a nonpriority civil case must wait between 16 and 18 months, 
depending upon the division in which it is pending, after the filing 
of the last brief before being calendared for oral argument."12 This 
aff0cts not only the litigants, but also the public, which needs to 
have unsettled issues of civil law resolved expeditiously. Although 
crit!1in;Jl c.1ses have priority, they too can be d£>1ayed by their heavy 
IHHJ:l,..rs-·-;Js much as 8 months bC>t'v.'f•(·n the filing of brjpfs ~md issuance 
of op1nion. 13 This might have the follov.'ing effects: (1) if the case 
is reversed for dismissal, delay may cause a presumably innocent inmate 
to serve unnecessary time (except in the rare case in which he was 
released on bail during the appeal--see California Penal Code §§ 1243-44, 
1272), (2) if the case is reversed for retrial, delay can cause loss 
of evidence to prosecution or defense, (3) delay could actually discourage 
meritorious appeals, where the sentence would be served before the appeal 
could be heard and decided. 
In California, indigent criminal appellants are represented either by 
private attorneys (who volunteer for appointment by the appellate courts) 
or by the State Public Defender. The cost to the st;'lte for the private 
attorneys is not too great--about $750 per case--mainly because we pay them 
so poorly. 14 The State Public Defender's Office--which uses full-time 
specialists in criminal appeals and handles about 37% of the indigent appeals 
--has estimated its costs at an average of about $2,804 per appea1. 15 
\.Jortbless cases might cost a bit less. as there are fewer issues to brief. 
Even in these cases, however, the attorney must spend substantial time reading 
the transcript and researching some law. The Administrator of the State 
11 
California Judicial Cnunci 1, 1980 Annual Report, page 63. 
12 
Christian, "Reducing Delay in the Courts," 56 California State Bar Journal 
120 (1981). See also California Judicial Council, 1980 Annual Report, page 64. 
13 
California Judicial Council, 1980 Annual Report, page 64. 
14 
See footnote 3, supra. Compensation is authorized by California Penal 
Code ~ 1241. 
15The Ac~inistrator of the State Public Defender's Office indicated that some 
Court of Ap?eal clerks assign cases to the State Public Defenders--rather than 
private counsel--where the appeal involves large transcripts and/or difficult 
issues. He also stated that the State Public Defender had a reversal rate of -102-
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Public Defender's Office estimates that worthless appeals, in which ''Anders 
briefs" are filed (about 6% of their caseload), involve about the same amount 
of work as other appeals. 
There may also be nonmonetary costs: (1) heavy caseloads might affect 
the quality of work, (2) handling a lot of "dead-bang losers" may be bad 
for morale, resulting in excessive turnover of attorneys, and (3) facing 
judges who may have become skeptical about the merits of indigent criminal 
appeals can also be quite disheartening. 
Prosecuting Attorneys: In California, all felony appeals are handled 
by the Attorney General's Office. The effect of nonmeritorious and marginal 
appeals on its budget and quality of work may be similar to the effect on the 
State Public Defender's Office. Currently, the Attorney General's budget 
office estimates that each appeal costs them an average of $2,110. 
In sum, the total cost of the usual indigent criminal appeal may be 
estimated at between $6,179 and $8,233. (This is based on $1,000 for 
transcripts, between $750 and $2,804 for appellant's counsel, $2,110 for 
the Attorney General, and $2,319 for the Court of Appeal.) 
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III. Possible 
A. 
n non-indigen riminal), the regulator of the 
use of various proc i t that the client must pay attorney's 
fees in order to d ce whether it be discovery, a jury trial, or an 
appeal. The attorney advises the lient as to how likely the procedural device 
is to further the client's interests and how much the device will cost. The 
client then balances se considerations and makes a decision.l6 If a criminal 
appeal has a 30% chan e S\Jcces but will cost him his life's savings, he 
might clecide to the appeal. Tn intligent criminal <lppe:~ls, th:is regulator 
is ~hsvnt. Except in very re ci"!ses,l7 •·very indigent has everything to gain 
. 
and absolutely nothing o lose ing, whether his chance of "'inning is 
30%, 3%, or one in a million. 
There are s indications that this is exactly how the inmates see it. 
\,fhile the chance of reversal on appeal is generally ratl1er lC>w (see page 2, 
ra , nevertheless, it appears that a very large percentage of defendants 
--'----' 
appeal. In 19 82% 18 of all court "contested criminal 
.dispositions" were to a 14% appeal rate for contested 
civil cases 20). Of the convictions that followed a contested trial, an 
1 Posner 
Ad.'Ttini stration, 
imposed a sentence 
be risky busines . 
For 
tionship 
to Legal Procedures and Judicial 
Studies 399, 4 30-4 31 ( 1973). 
o~~itted at trial, but the trial court 
minimum, filing an appeal could 
Calif. Judicial Council, 1980 
"r:ote that this does not necessarily 
dispositions actually appealed. 
of guilty, a few of which were 
to show th~ general rela· 
rior court dispositions. "(err::>hasis added} 
104-
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The premise of this study is that if a cost regulator is properly 
plugge<i into this si.tu:1tion, m:my iudigt•nt il1ln:llt•s I.Ji.ll J,,ci<ie to forego 
appeals ~here the chance of success is so low that most non-indigents 
would do the same, without feeling that they have lost valuable rights. 
The proponent is aware of no study, experiment, or practice which has 
put this premise to the test in indigent criminal appeals--or, for that 
matter, in any aspect of the criminal justice system. 
The function of payment as a cost regulator has, however, been tested 
in the field of medical services. In 1972-73, the California Department of 
Health conducted an experiment on "copayment" in the Hedi-Cal program. An 
extensive report on this experiment appears in Brian & Gibbens, ''California's 
~edi-Cal Copayment Experiment'', 12 Hcdical Care (Special Supplement, December 
1974). About 30% of those eligible for Medi-Cal were required to pay one 
dollar for each of their first 2 visits to a doctor each month and SO¢ for 
each of their first 2 drug prescriptions each month. Copayment was required 
only for people who could "afford it". Id at p.l. Even though the dollar 
and 50¢ requirements were viewed as "minimal" deterents, the report concluded 
. that: 
The overall pattern revealed shows that copayment had an effect 
and the effect was toward lower utilization (of medical services) 
particularly for less critical services. [rd. at p. 561 22 
The only negative aspect of copayment was that it appeared to cause a 
duction in the use of preventive (as opposed to corrective) health 
care services. IA.:_ at p. 56. 
22A b. . . i . d . more su Ject1ve op1n on was once vo1ce by S1gmund Freud, who said that 
fees gave a patient an incentive to terminate psychoanalysis when he or she 
felt "cured" (or hopeless). See ~ew York ~fagazine, Xovember 24, 1980, page 77. 
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It might be noted that the California Legislature recently adopted a 
copayment plan which would require most Medi-Cal recipients to pay $1 for 
each doctor visit, $1 for each drug prescription, and S5 for each hospital 
emergency room visit \..'here the visit \,'as not in fact for an emergency. This 
23 
copayment plan is expected to save the state $45 million in 1981-82. 
B. P;-,_::I~C:_!"!_~_from ~'Clf_C~ J_or:_Work _i_n Cus_to_d): 24 
In \::11ifornia, db(>ut h.1lf of the state prison population does some sort 
of work for pay. In 1981, there were 25,600 inmates. Of these, about 8,700 
>Wrked in 11\Jork support" positions (kitchen, laundry, etc.), 345 "-'Orked in 
"in.rr.ate welfare" positions (e.g., the prison canteen), 2,150 worked in the 
prison industries program (maufacture of license plates, flags, furniture, 
etc.), and 1,500 \Jorked in conservation camps (doing forestry and firefighting). 
Pay ranged from 5c to 35c per hout, depending on the skill required and the 
inmate's seniority. 
The V;jges may be spent at the prison canteen on cigarettes, candy, small 
"luxury" items {like cologne), and even small appliances such as radios. }lost 
inmates want to have such items occasionally, so they \JOuld like to some money, 
even the small amounts which are paid for prison work. Thus, the jobs are much 
sought after, and prison officials do not hzve enough jobs for all inmates 
who ... :ant them. 
One's initial impression might be that if an indigent inmate had to pay a 
portion of his prison wages towards the costs of his appeal, we would have an 
effective cost regulator similar to that faced by non-indigent inmates. Such 
a requirement should be constitutional, since the inmate is still being provided 
with all the necessities of life, free of charge. (One official stated, "A man 
can serve his entire term without spending a penny.") 
23
san Francisco Examiner and Chronicle, June 14, 1981, page 4. 
24 All figt1res in this section are from an intervie"-' "-'i th George 'i,'arner of the 
California Department of Correction, on ~lay 18, 1981. 
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The portion of wages taken should be set at a percentage high enough 
to m;Jke the in::1ate feel he is giving up something substnntial if he appeals, 
but not so high as to discourage him from working or pursuing a potentially 
meritorious appeal. Perhaps something like a third of his wages for one year 
would be appropriate, or maybe a sliding scale (depending on wages) would be 
better. 
Preliminary research indicates that this scheme will not work, at least 
in the California prison system. The problem is one of timing. Since the 
jobs are desirable, and there is only one job for every two inmates, the 
newer inmates may have to wait some time for a job opening. Even if a new 
inmate gets a job, he will probably start at a very low pay, near 5¢ an hour. 
Also, every new inmate spe1~ds some time initially at one of the reception 
enters--Vacaville or Chino--where there is very little likelihood of work 
for him. This is where he is likely to be when the time for filing notice 
of appeal runs. The net result is that, at the time when the inmate is called 
~to decide whether to appeal, he is either working at a very low-paying 
ob or--most likely--not working at all. In this situation, he has little 
to give up in return for appealing. 
A possible way around this problem would be to require the inmate who 
ides to ;1ppeal to agrc•e to pay part of his wages in the f_u_t_u_r_~. when he 
t:('t :t ldghl•r·p:Iying Job. Cnrrl•!'! ional offic!<1ls indicate that this 
will not work, because most inmates have trouble relating to future conse-
quences: "If these guys could plan ahead, they wouldn't be here," said 
25 
25 
"In::Jates in the prison system, generally, •.. have very little patience to 
rk for or wait for the things they desire." Report to the Director, California 
Department of Corrections, "Team for Inmate Hork Training Expansion Programs," 
~arch 15, 1981, at pp. 12-13. 
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C. Pavmen t from an "Inmate Appeal Fund" 
The essence of this idea is simple: if the inmate doesn't have the money 
to serve as a cost-regulator, let's give it to him. 
\\'hile the above conclusion was reached independently by the proponent, he 
later discovered that he had been preceded by a very thoughtful discussion of 
this concept, in Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg, Justice on Aopeal, at pages 
26 91-95 (\~est, 1976). There, the authors propose establishing a "Criminal 
Defense and Rehabilitation· Fund," which would "give the indigent defendant 
something to lose in the appeal similar to that v.•hich tbe non-indigent hDs." 
Id. at 93. They further state: 
This plan would force the defendant to think about his case as a 
non-indigent must. The plan would not treat indigents less favor-
ably. Indl'cd it V.'imld afford tlH'm a fin:mc1a1 ],PnPfit not no\J 
:lV; li 1 . 1 h 1 e • [ T cl • a t 9 I~ ] • 
\.Jldle Carrington, et al, set out the basic concept, they do not discuss 
the many important details that would have to go into such a system. This 
proposal--if funded--would attempt to develop those details. 
Here is ho\J such a syste~ might work in California: 
Step 1: 1--'henever a defendant is sentenced to state prison, $200 
is deposited by the state into his "inmate appeal fund." 
He may not spend any of this money--yet. 
Step 2: After his trial attorney consults with him regarding 
whether an appeal might be successful,27 the inmate 
dPcidl'S wlwther to file a notice of appe>al. If he 
allows the time for filing a notice of appeal to pass 
v:ithout filing, he gets to spend or keep the $200 as 
he wishes.28 If he files a notice of appeal, a clerk's 
transcript and (usually) a reporter's t~anscript must 
be preparf'd, \,•hfch costs money. 'Therefore, a "transcript 
fee" of $100 v.•ill be deducted from the appeal fund. The 
inmate still cannot spend the remaining $100--yet. 
26Mr. Justice Winslow Christian also referred to this notion at 56 California 
State Bar Journal 121-122 (1981). 
27This consultation is already required by California Penal Code s1240.1. 
28
subject to reasonable prison regulations. For example, it might be wise 
to provide that he cannot spend more than $50 a month, and that he can have it 
only in the form of credits at the prison CJnteen, or on his release, or send 
it to his family. 
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Step 3: Appellate counsel is appointed, who reads the transcripts 
and consults \vi th the inmate. The inmate may then continue 
the appeal or dismiss it. If he fails to sign a dismissal 
within (say) a week after the consultation, the appellate 
counsel will begin work on the opening brief, and an 
"appellate counsel's fee" of $100 will be deducted from the 
appeal fund. If the inmate signs the dismissal in time, 
he may then keep or spend the remaining $100. 
If this system induces a mere 10% of the state prison irunates who now 
appeal not to appeal, the savings to the state will be substantial. About 
11,000 people are sentenced to state prison each year. Records on how many 
of these appeal are not presently kept, but it has been suggested that a 
large number do so. 29 . Let us assume that 4,000 1nmates appeal. Let us also 
30 
assume that each appeal costs the state about 7,000 (for the appellate 
court, attorney general, and appellant's counsel). The state would have 
to pay $2,200,000 to provide $200 appeal funds for the 11,000 inmates. If 
10% of the 4,000 who would appeal decide not to appeal, then the state saves 
400 times $7,00~ or $2.8 million. In addition, the state gets back $720,000 
from the 3,600 inmates who go ahead with their appeals and forfeit the $200. 
The state comes out ahead by over $1.3 8illion every year. 
If the appeal fund system induces more than 10% to decide not to pursue 
s, the savings increase dramatically: 
Annual Savings 
10% $1,320,000 
20% $4,040,000 
30% $6,760,000 
40% $9,480,000 
50% $12,200,000 
29The Administrator of the State Public Defender's Office said that almost 
all of their clients are in state prison. Therefore, since there were 4,586 
criminal appeals in 1979-80, it is fair to assume that 4,000 of these came 
from prison inmates. 
30Th is $7,000 figure is roughly the sum of the usual costs of the transcripts 
($1,000), the appellant's counsel ($750-$2,804), the Attorney General ($2,110), 
+_.,- t t-'k""" r ....... _ .. ""' ...... 4= , __ ...... _, tC') ?1n\ 
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This, of course, is in addition to the nonmonetary, qualitative benefits 
to the state discussed earlier. 
Before such a system should be established statewide in California prisons, 
seve~·al js~;ues need to he explored. 
First, the figures mentioned in this proposal should be confirmed or 
amended, in order to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of the propesed 
system. \&ere present record-keeping practices do not keep track of certain 
important figures, additional record-keeping may be recommended. 
Second, an attempt should be m3de to set an amount for the appeal fund 
which is proper: not so high as to induce inmates to drop appeals which have 
a decent chance of succPss, ;md not so 1ow as to be cons:ids'red trivial by 
the inm;itcs. '11H' $700 nwntioned <1bove \<:1s a visceral <ittempt to meet these 
criteria. $500--or $100--migh~ well be a more appropriate figure. 
Third, we must ensure that indigent inmates will be at least as well 
advised as their non-indigent counterparts regarding the possible success 
of an appeal. Presently, such advice must be given by trial counsel under 
Penal Code s 1240.1, but not by appellate counsel, who usually has no particular 
reason to advise his client that the appeal has little chance of success. 
Fourth, we should examine whether the system should be applied to convicted 
felons who receive probation (with or without county jail time). These cases 
apparently account for the bulk of felony convictions, but only a small portion 
of appeals. Would the appeal fund system be cost effective if applied to these 
people? (Excluding these people ·should raise no equal protection problem. 
See In r_e __ _?jm~ (1981) 117 Cal. App. 3d 309; _I_n _ _!"_<:_~<3.Y~ _ _9_:_ (1979) 93 Cal. App. 3d 
247, 252-255.). 
-110-
...... -
Fifth, should tl1e system be applied to juvenile appeals? Do they constitute 
a significant number of appeals? Is there a way to focus on those juveniles who 
file 'most of the appeals (e.g., those "sentenced" to California Youth P.ut!-lority)? 
Is any "appeal fund" simply too tempting to an indigent juvenile inmate whose 
ability to make intelligent decisions about his life is presumably quite dubious? 
-111-
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IV. 
A consultant on testing methodology will be retained to assist in designing 
a pilot project to test and evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed system. 
The pilot project might take the following form. To facilitate evaluation, 
the project should be confined to a single appellate district. During a one 
year period, all felons ~ho are convicted ~~d sentenced to state prison in that 
district ~ill be tracked. Two hunered and fifty of these inmates (the test 
group) "'ill reC'eive "~:}>peal funds"; the rest (the eontrol group) will receive 
not.lling, <!IH'i ~.}JP:ir ckcisiul1!> rc·c.:,;;rc1in~ r:ppvnl will not lle affeeted by the project. 
Of the 250 in the test g~oup, 50 will receive appeal funds of $500, .50 will 
receive $Loo, 50 will receive $300, 50 will receive $200, and 50 will receive 
$100. EA.ch appeal fund will be divided into 2 parts ("transcript fee" and 
"appellate counsel's fee") in accordance with the 3-step procedure described 
earlier. At the end of the year, we will determine whether. the percentages 
of notices of appeal and opening briefs filed were different for any of the groups. 
Smaller test and control groups involving convicted felons who were not 
sentenced to state prison ~~d juvenile offenders might also be selected. 
To run the pilot project. we will need the cooperation of several 
agencies: 
l. Slweri or Courts in the piJot district will 'b;,ve to 'inform 
c'Jr~;ense c~:unsel of t.he project wh(·never the ccr,vict.ed 
defendant has b0en ~elected for the test grou~, so that 
defense counsel may take the appeal fund into account 
when advising the defendant whether to file a notice of 
appeal. 
2. The Court of Aupeal for the pilot district will have to 
inform appellant's counsel of the project whenever 
appellant is part of the test group, and instruct 
counsel to consult with the appellant before preparing 
the opening brief. If this requires an extension of the 
ti~e for filing the opening brief. the Court should be 
prepared to grant such extensions. 
3. The Denart~ent of Corrections will have to agree to 
ad."":".inister the :ir.~ate appeal funds and esta"tlish 
reasonatle ree::ulc-ti ons re>rardinf: the spending o'!:' 
~oneys not forfeited. 
, 1 ')_ 
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V. Eve1luation 
--~----
The consultants will keep track of filings by the test and control 
groups, and at the end of the year will compute the totals and percentages 
from each group who filed notices of appeal and opening briefs. 
nu~nber in the control group, after the opening brief has been filed, 
tte cppeal has been dismissed, or the time for filing the notice of appeal 
has run. The questior~aire will ask the inmate what influenced his decision 
• ng his appeal. Similar questionnaires will be sent to the inmate's 
trial counsel and appellate couns~l. If the ir~ate decided not to pursue 
an appeal, counsel should also be asked his opinion as to whether an appeal 
would have been hopeless, carginal, or possibly successful. ·This will give 
us some idea as to whether potentially meritorious appeals are being discouraged 
by the appeal fund. 
'Thour;h this would dc~lay ccmpl(:tinn of the cv«luation for several months 
(at least), it would also be helpful to track the success rate of those inmates 
in all groups who go through with their appeals. If the project succeeds in 
discouraging mainly hopeless and margi!1al appeals by the test groups, then one 
would expect that those innates in the test groups who do follow through on 
their anneals will have a higher percentage of reversals and ~odifications than 
ants in the control group. Also, it should be surprising if any 
-----
briefs are filed by members of the test groups. If any are filed, 
should try to discover the reason for this. 
-113-
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VI. Results 
.t:..t ti:e end of the eva1uation, a report will be prepared. The report will 
desc::ibe the pu::?ose of the p:ilot project, :its methodology, ?.nd the results 
of t!1e evc:1uP.~ion. If the results look promising, the report may recor-'Tlend 
legisl;;.t:ion edopting the in::~e.te appeal fund system on a statewide basis. 
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Vli. Advisory Com1:~i ttee 
- _,._ .. _·-·-·-~·-
It would be very helpful to have :m Advisory Committee, !'lade up of 
representatives from participating and interested agencies, to help set 
up the pilot project and the evaluation, and later to review the results 
and ~ake reco~~endations. At a minimum, the following agencies should be 
requested to send representatives to the Advisory Committee: the Judicial 
Council, the Court of Appeal for the pilot district, the Attorney General, 
the State Public Defender, and the Depart~ent of Corrections. Other people 
wno show particular interest or expertise regarding this matter reay also 
be invited to be members of the Advisory Ccmmittee. 
' 
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\llll.Timetable 
After this proposal is funded, it should take no more than 4 months to 
retain a tonsultant on testing methodology, assemble an Advisory Co111mittc>e, 
and design the pilot project. To put the pilot project in place would take 
another two months. The pilot project will then operate for 12 months. 
Evaluation should take no more than another 3 months, although if we wish 
to include d.1ta on rf'ver~;a1 r;Jtes, this v.'i1l take .:hnut ;>nothcr year. 
Prt'p.lt.Jtiun of the final r"purl shollld t;1ke ;Jbnut 4 lllonths (tho11gh much 
of this can be done '-Yhile \.Je are \.;ai ting for the reversal statistics). 
In sum, the final report should be ready no later than 32 months after 
the proposal is funded. 
TX. Rud1•et 
-116-
'I'he cvaluatiun will be conducted under the auspices of Golden Gate 
University, a vate, 
main office is located at 5 
t institution of higher education, whose 
Mission Street, San Fr~~cisco, California 
442-7000. The University will be responsible 
for adn:d nis the funds, and is willing to make in-kind contributions 
to the evaluation. 
XI. Di 
---------
The director of the evaluation would be Myron Moskovitz. r~. Moskovitz 
is currently a Professor of Law at Golden Gate University and ChairDan of the 
State Commission of Housing and Commun Development. He received his L.L.B. 
with honors from Boalt Hall in 1964, served as law clerk to Mr. Justice Ray 
Peters of the California Supreme Court, was Directing Attorney of the 
Marysville Office of California Jural Legal Assistance, Inc., and Chief 
Attorney of the National Housing Law Project. He has published extensively 
and has handled many cases in the California appellate courts. His complete 
resume is attached as Appendix II. 
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PROPOSED BUDGET 
___ p_~ J-lo_I:!_t:h_~-
In-Kind 
Cash Contributions 
Subtotal Total 
I. Consultants 
Director 
(400 hours @ $80 per hour) 
Consultant on testing methodology 
(100 hours@ $80 per hour) 
One research assistant 
(400 hours @ $10 per hour) 
One executive secretary 
(200 hours @ $10 per hour) 
II. Travel 
Mileage (7500 miles @ $0.20 per mile) 
Per Diem (50 days @ $50 per day) 
Telephone ($31.25 per month) 
Copying 
Postage 
* Space (32 months @ $500 per month) 
** Inmate appeal funds 
250 State prison inmates 
Probationers and juveniles 
Recipients indirect costs 
(20% of total project cash costs 
of $137,000) 
REQUESTED Fill\DING 
*Space ~ill be contributed by rec1p1ent. 
$32,000 
8,000 
4,000 
2,000 
$46,000 
1,500 
4,000 
1,000 
500 
500 
$16,000 
75,000 
10,000 
27,400 
114,400 
$164,400 
**All funds forfeited by inmates who choose to appeal ~ill be returned to the grantor. 
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EXHIBIT E 
/I.SSS!1BI_ Y JUDICIARY At!D CPit1JfJAL JUSTICE rorHUTTEFS 
JtHERH1 ~~EARJNG 
APPELLATE COUP-T EFFJCIEf·lCY 
SAN DIEGO. CALIFORNIA 
OCTOBER 15. 1981 
f'HAIFH'iAiJ & t1Er~RERS: 
f1Y NM1E IS JOHN DAVIES. I At1 ~JITH THE 
ADt1!tliSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS. I APPREf!ATE THE 
OPPOI1TUtHTY TO BE f IEI1E HITH YOU TODAY. 
PURSUArlT TO THE COr1i1ITTEE'S H!VITATiotJ. I HAVE 
PROVIOED YOUR Cot!SUL TMJTS lJITH DATA RELATING TO THE ItJCREASE 
Irl APPEU_ATE UOPKLOAD AND PRODUCTIVITY. 
JUST AS CALIFORfJIA' S POPULATION HAS ItlCREASED OVER 
THE PAST 20 YEARS, SO HAS THE i·IUt'18F.R OF ATTORt!EY' S IN THE 
' STATE (TO 80,000), AS H/IS THE tJUt':BER OF TRIAL CCURT FILitJGS, 
NJD, It! TURtl, APPEALS TO niE COlJRTS OF APPEAL IN THIS STATE. 
OVER LAST 10-12 YEARS, THE rJUtmER OF CIVIL 1\t·JD 
UUt1J1l/'.l_ 1\PPI-"/\I.S Hf,S GROt!t·l AT A.ROUT T!·IE Sl\t1E r;ATE, NJD TIUS 
IS iiOT lJiJJC[IE TO CAI.IFOP!JJA. 
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OCTOBEr 15, 1981 
PAGE 2 
DURitlG THE 11 YEAR PERIOD 19G7 -G8 TO 78-79, THERE 
\JAS AN AVErAGE ArltlUAL ItJCnEASE RATE Itl CIVIL APPEf\LS OF 
J\80UT 7h. 
THE CRJt1ItlAL RATE OVER THIS Tit1E HAS ALSO BEEN ?% • 
!flTEREST!t!GLY, THE GRotiTH PATE OVER A SUBSTAtlTIALL Y Sit1ILAR 
PERIOD ItJ THE UtiiTED STATES tiiNTH CTRCUIT \·JAS A CLOSE 6.5%. 
ItJ 1980 
1980 SHm.JED A CHMJGE REPORTED IN OUR 1981 JUDICIAL 
COliNCII_ REPORT, IN ~JHICH CIVIL APPEALS ACCELLERATEn. 
THE 1979-80 FIGURES SHOUED A 16% JUt1P OVER THE 
PREVIOUS YF.J\R TO If, 2t~9 CIVIL A.PPEALS. 
THIS OCCURRED AT THE SAt1E Tit:E THAT THE rHJfiBER OF 
COtlTESTED SUPEFUOR COUf<T CIVIL ACTIOtJS DECI1EASED. 
ItJCREASitJG THE PROPORTiotJ OF SIJPEf<IOR COURT COt'JTESTED 
DJSPOSITiotJS T /\KEN ON APPEAL TO 17% FR0!1 1 Lf%. 
Dll_THE Jfs_IlDJJAL_-'Sll2L_Tf 1EI:E \WRE '-i,!">PR CR:rt1JtJAL 
/\Pnr"l s I t , .... , ..,. '-. f A 7 ')Of Ttlr'f?F"<'r 0\fF:r:; Tlw l)n[:\JTOtl 0 yr"R t~~l.D .( .. j.) .!t\'\.t'.\JL ~\ :r_ ''- ,.v r·.,.\, t 
('l:''l:r: "I I Y PI I P 'f-_- 1 'J TL! 1-I'E 7 ~' rl.-ll-- '(r: "'R 1-,-,,_.1 !D J.l. l·li--- . I< __ fl_ I• ,f, '- 11, I Lfl\ .  • 
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Ttl GF]JERAL THEtl, THE P./\ TES OF JrJCm:ASE otJ HIE CIVIL 
MID CRit1It!AL SIDES HAVE UJCP.EASEO SifJCE 1970 AT M101JT 7%; 
\·JITII THE LATEST REPORT YEAR STATISTICS SflotJitJG CIVIL JIJI1PitJG 
1 G% ArlO CfUtUt:AL ItlCf1EASit JG 7. 2%. 
;HEPE 'S BEErJ A LotlG-RArJGE PRODUCTIVITY ItJCREASE BY APPELLATE 
COURTS DURHJG THIS PERIOD OF JJJCRFASitJG ~JORKLOAD 
LOOK!fJG BACK OVER THE PERIOO. 1~59-GO TO 1979-80, t/E 
FitiD THAT. TOTAL FILitJGS ItJ H!E COUf1TS~ OF 1\PPEAL OF THJS 
STATE IfJCREASED FIVE-FOLD, FRot1 1.899 TO 1L~.757. 
APPEALS ALotiE ItlCREASED TO 8.835, OR ABOUT L!.7 
Tit1ES AS t1AtlY. 
' 
J;JRITTEI'J OPHJiotlS OUTPUT BY THE COURTS OF APPEAl , 
JlJt1PED lJ. G Tir1FS TO G, G59 FRot1 1, t:qo. 
TilE tlllf1F3EP. OF JlJST!CES DUR!fiG TI:/\T Tit1E, HmJEVF.R, 
It.Jf'REASEO FP.ot1 21 TO 59, OR 2. 8 TitlES. 
CI.F f,RI_ Y. TilE AFPfTI 1\ TE COUfriS t!/\ VF~ DUJJ 
:U:CPI- /\SHJGI_ Y PnODtJC IJVE, f<UT fJOT 0UITE SO f~UCH AS THE 
P!(~f?I·~~~F PI .].f!r· (.'llf'•\ITI1 r,c AJ'•J)1:11 f'-]·f: lli.Tf'l\ 'T(JrJ _,_!~. <f\,., * _J, ,r_ ) \.1, 1 ,1 1\1 I ~ _,, _ .... Jt1l~- • 
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Pf1ESEfiTLY 
THERE ARE A NUtlBER OF SYSTEt1-\JIOE CHAtlGES THAT HAVE 
RFCEtJTL Y BEEN PUT JN PLACE I JHJCH SHOULD FACILITATE A t10RE 
FFFICIEtJT, PP.OOUCTIVE APPELLATE SYSTH1. 
FIRST, T! 1ArlKS TO CflAir;t1AtJ HARRIS, THERE UILL BE 1\tl 
/\IJDITiot 1AL 3-JUDGE DIVISiotJ IrJ THE FIRST DISTRICT ( S. F.), 
Af!D C t10RE JlJDGES HI THE SECOI'ID (L/\-SAtlTA BAr~RARA (3)): q ItJ 
Tl !E FOURTH ( ORAI'lGE COUf'JTY); 2 IN THE FIFTH ( FREStJO); ArlO 3 
IN THE tJEtJ GTH OISTRICT. AS YOU l~fJO\J, THE STArlDARD APPLIED 
It·l THAT CASE liAS 10S llRITTEtJ OPHJIONS PER JUDGE PER YEAR, UP 
FfWf1 THE JllDICIAL COUNCIL'S OFFICIAL POLICY OF 95 PER JUDGE 
PER YEAR, 9!1 STAtlDARD ADOPTED ItJ 1975 AtJD BASED Jtl PART ON 
THE PECOt1t1EtJDATIOtJ OF THE tl/\ TiotlAL CEtJTER FOR STATE COURTS. 
ADt1HJISTRATIVE 11EASURES HAVE IfJCUJDED: 
1. l3Y CHIJF JUSTICE OIRECTION THERE'S GEDJ AfJ 
ItlTRODUCTION OF Cot1PUTERIZED BlJSJJlESS PRACTil.ES, IrJCLUDHJG 
lJORD PP.OC:ESSH!G. LEGAL RESEARCH (LEXIS), AtJD It! TilE tlEAR 
FlJTllt;E nATA PROCESSI!!G noc!<ETIIJG BY TilE CI_FPK' s OFFICE. 
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?. • APPonnr 1FtJT fl.t'D REPORT OF TilE cHJEF JIJSTICE 's 
SPF.CJ AL COfHliTTEE otJ APPFLLATE PRACT~CES MlD PROCTDUPES Itl 
THE FIP.ST APPELLATE DISTRICT - THE FEifJREPG - SELIGSotJ 
Rf::PORT. 
EACH OF YOU HAS RECEIVED EITHER A COPY OR A SUtlt1ARY 
OF ITS FHJDitJGS AIJD COfJCLUSIOtJS, I BELIEVE. THIS flATTER IS 
TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE tJOVEt1RER JUDICIAL COutJCIL t1EETHJG. 
3. ADOPTION OF T!IE 11ULE 21. 5, PROVIDHJG FOR THE 
COURTS TO DO CIRCUIT RIDH!G FOR THE CotlVErJIEtJCE OF THE 
PARTIES AtlD THETR COUtJSEL AS A COIJRT PERCEIVES POSSIBLE f'IEED. 
THE EFFECT OF THIS IS AS YET Ut:DETERt1ItlED, ~liTH THE 
FIRST EXERCISE TO OE IN SAtJ JOSE, BY THE FIRST DISTRICT 
LATER THIS YEAR. 
4. JUDICIAL COWJCIL HAS llTILIZED EIGHT PERt 1M lENT 
Lit1ITEO-Tr-J!t1 POSITIOrJS FOR SECotlD SO-CALLED "ELBOIJ-CIYPK" 
ATTOPflEYS \tJITH SUCCESS: 
Oi l[ CF .,f'E DT\/T<:'TQfiS TO lJl.TI T7E Tr;cc;r- ')i 1D Pf-nt 1 Ar~r:~lT ~ _ .. 1 • _._ .. _._, 1 _ _ ; , \. -· ___ ~_ _ r , L \_.., r_ t. ~ ~ . 1 \ , l • r 
I Tf·1ITI·~o--l-f·r·)i 1 f-1 PC\·J C'l ~--11 1/ 0 I 1A(.' 1-llA·r cr ~'n'.l ('l 11)1'f.-f1[ ('nlJf'T -· _._ . _ _ i ._ \ ! __ ·-- ,_; ) . _ \ \0 ·, \ V J r I i,, \ 4 u ; ·, _ ; -- .., L' \ 
rti 0 JT(~l~- ()·1-T(' '/AI'S (1 1·: ,.f'f-- ('['r"f\110 'J'r<'.Jfll(~f t:I'O 1;1 i)('P·r~·L) ··1·1ns 
U ,J\) w ' • I ) !\I\ J } '- \,)fwl; ..J! ~ j, - \) f '-- / f " l I '- J1\ I, ••- \ 
/\L 1.01 !U) 1!!11 lO: 
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SPFtlD SI JFTCM~TLY t~OF:E TH1E DOitJG "!t!ITI AL 
PESEARCil" - UJOT SUGGESTED BY THE PAR-riES, A 
CCL LEAGUE. OR RESEARCH ATTORtJEY): 
SPHJD HJICE AS t1UCH Tit1E READitiG THE RECOF<D Irl CASES 
HE HAD TO DECIDE BUT ~JAS tJOT THE PRirJCIPAL AUTHOR 
OF THE OPitliotJ; 
SPEtJD LESS TJt1E OOifJG ROUTINE t·JRJTHJG ArlO EDITHJG; 
CotlFEP.fUt!G tJ~TH COLLEAGUES BEFORE CIRCULATIOtl OF AN 
OPitJiorJ Df{AFT ~lAS AUT I !OREO 
OVERALL, HE ASSESSED IT THIS \JAY: 
/ 
"THE SECOtJD ATTORfiEY fiAS f1J\OE IT POSSIBLE TO DEVOTE 
t10RE Tif1E TO THE :riiOGt1EriTAL ASPECTS OF t1Y JOR, AS 
f!JSTit'GlJTSHEO FR0t1 THE POTE UC:RK OF fJTGESTTNG F A\TS, OOHJG 
Bfl.SIC RESEARCH ArlO SO Otl. JT I !AS ALSO G!\!Erl t1E t :or:E Tit1E TO 
EXAfHtlE APPEALS ASSIGtlED TO OTHER JUDGES. ItJ ADOITiotJ IT 
HAS GIVDl US A LITTLE r10RE CPPORTlJ!liTY TO DO CEf(T;\ItJ TI!JtJGS 
l!E SI!OlJLD m~~ DOiflG, DUT FOR \JHICH tiE llEVER SFE!1 TO HAVE 
L!JOUGH TitlE: rH-:1\DHJG 1\f)VldJCE Sl IFETS, 1./\\J f?EVInJ /I.RTTCLES, 
UC. 1: n1 1<1.1 P /\1\f~I:N:>T OF IJUI Ci\:)1-~S M.ID OTIII H DEVf:U!Pi1UITS HJ 
11 : 1~ 1 .t.l n . " 
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THE GOVEFWOP. 'S LAST OlJDGET AT TI-lE RE0lJFST OF THE 
JUrrrriAL C0lHJC!L ASKED FOR FUtmS TO PROVIDE EACH APPELLATE 
JUSTICE \JITH StJrH A POSITiml: TPJS liAS DELETED IrJ THE Rt!DGET 
PP.OCE~S HmJEVER. 
(THE POSITIOrJS LAST 2 YEARS lJITH SALARY If JCREASE; 
LOfJGER lJITHOUT FUTURE ItiCREASE OR A t10VE ItJTO A REGULAR 
STAFF POSITION.) 
CfJJTRAL STAFF 
POLICY OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL ~!AS BEEt! 1 FOR EACH 2 
JUSTICES SH!I.E 197 5. 
RAISES DEEP PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS. SirJCE THIS 
CHEATES A BUREAUCRACY lJITH AN HJDEPE,tlDUJT LIFE OF ITS mJtJ. 
NOT SUBJECT TO SAt lE RESPOI'JSIVEIJESS AS THE "ELBmJ CLERKS" 
GOOD POST -.JlJDCf1UJT JtlTF:J:EST BILL TO REt lOVE /IJlY 
Fir Ji\iJCTM_ Jf !CUJTIVE FOR A P/IFrfY TO Ttd~E MJ J\PPE/11 FOR 
CTf!,~r:rTI'I r~c-J-T\/f-- 0 -,--() r)!--1 fl'( nrvr.•r·rll" (II: A -f['[',Cf!'·r:r r -' I ~ 1 \ 1 • _, , \ __ ~ .1 _ \' ~ 0 __ . t \ r \ 1 1 1 .) u 1 .~ j ~t . • • (/% vs 
1 )'~'- ,: 1_- 11 -1- ~· ,/ 1_ r) r, t .u _ 1 ,r, _ 1 
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It1t1EOI ATE PPFP /\RATIOtl At JO FOI<I JAROitlG OF TRAllS\fUPTS 
AtJD RECORD JfJ CRitUt!AL APPEALS lASES. 
THE FIRST OISTRICT EARLIER THIS YEAR FOUND ITSELF 
FACED ~liTH A SUOST AtiTIAL BACKLOG OF CASES tJECESSITATHJG UP 
TO A 22 110NTH DELAY Ir.J SOHE ItJST AtlCES. 
THE PRESIDitJG Aot1HIISTRATIVE JUSTICE JOHtJ T. 
RACAtJELLI REOUESTFD ASSISTANCE FRot1 THE CHIEF JUSTICE otJ 
THIS 11/\TTEP.. 
IN RESPot:SE TO THAT REQUEST, tJITH THE COOPER/\ Tim! 
OF THE ATTORtiEY GEtJEP.AL AriD THE STATE PURLIC DEFHIDER Cfl 
CRit1ItiAL CASES. ArlO tJITH THE COOPERATIOtJ OF COUNSEL ItJ THE 
CIVIL tiATTERS, APPROXIt1ATEL Y 100 CASES UERE TRI\flSFERRED TO 
' OTHER APPELLATE DIVISIONS t,JHERE TilE tJORKLOAD ~JAS t10RE 
t1AtlAGEAOLE. 
:rtJ ADOITIOt!, tJitJE PRO- TH1 JUSTICES \JERF ASSIGrJED BY 
THE CHIEF JIISTICE TO ASSIST TilE FIRST BEGJtHJJt!G ~>EPTEI1B[f( 1. 
1981 AtJD Er!DitJG r:osnmER 1. 1ss1. CLERK's CFFJCE SLJPPCfn 
STAFF \!f\.S ALSO SlJPPLFl1UJTf-:D. 
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WllFRIED J. KRAMER, CLERK 
ROBERT LISTON, CHIEF DEPVrY 
MARY-lOUISE KING, OEPUTY 
SUSAN WHITEACRE 
D. BRUCE KORDENBROCK 
Our Court is ins 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
C!!nurt nf Apprnl 
APPEUA TE DISTRICT 
STATE Of CAI.IFOINIA 
LIBRARY AND COURTS BUILDING 
914 CAPITOL MALL 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814 
AREA CODE 916, ~77 
of certain civil appeals 
a program designed to permit resolution 
on an expedited basis. This program empha-
sizes reliance on 
as the primary vehicle 
rather than traditional written briefs 
presentation of an appeal. 
The premise underlying this program is that the Court does not 
require full brie cases issues are straightforward 
and can be del and succinctly. Appellant's Opening 
Brief and Respondent's here 1 to a maximum of ten (10) 
pages (in letter form if excluding the statement of facts, 
will serve three bas purposes: (a) allow counsel to know the 
essence of the arguments to be ; (b) provide the Court with a 
means of advance preparation, and (c) provide the framework for 
oral argument. No Closing Brief permitted. The Court believes 
that this program t faster, simpler, and less expensive 
appeals without the quality of judicial review and 
decision. 
Limited briefing addresses two problems which delay the resolution 
of an appeal and costs. First, it reduces the time 
consumed and effort in briefin~. Second, it 
shortens the time between the close of briefing and oral argument, 
thereby eliminating to a great extent the need for renewed preparation. 
approximately thirty days 
The argument itself is intended as an 
session at which counsel assist the 
sues. The Court expects to file its 
The oral argument 
after the filing of 
informal and relative 
Court's exploration 
opinion within five to ten days oral argument. 
Participation 
upon stipulations 
program will be voluntary and will depend 
counsel. 
The program will operate as follows: 
1. Only cases which counsel have stipulated to the use of 
the original record will be considered for participation in the pro-
gram at this time. 
2. The Court will identify appeals it considers appropriate for 
the new procedures from those cases in which pre-argument statements 
are filed; from those which are not resolved following settlement 
conferences; and those cases in which a stipulation requesting the 
new procedure is received and accepted. 
3. Counsel for appellant will be responsible for obtaining 
the required stipulations. 
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4. Upon receipt of the stipulation, the Court will enter a 
scheduling order setting forth the filing dates for the briefs, 
and setting the date for argument. Appellant will have twenty 
days from the order within which to file his/her brief. Respon-
dent's brief will be due within twenty days of the filing deadline 
for appellant's brief. No extensions of time for briefing will 
be permitted. Argument Will be set for-approximately thirty-days 
thereafter. In cases in which reporters' transcripts were ordered 
and have not been filed, the scheduling order will be made when 
the transcript is filed. 
Any questions regarding the new procedures may be directed to 
Wilfried J. Kramer, Clerk, (916) 445-4677. 
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We 
resolution as 
agree to issuance 
typewritten 
(a) Appellant 
(b) Respondent s 
of appel 
(c) No 
We understand 
that our briefs 
statement 
date for oral 
the scheduling 
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nf <t!altfnmta 
considered for expedited 
of invitation and 
providing for filing of 
20 days of order; 
after due date 
1 be accepted. 
will be granted and 
, not including 
order will set a 
0 days from date of 
Attorneys for Respondent 
The 6-month experin1ental pilot program for expea1t1ng 
civil appeals is sponsored by the Action Commission to Reduce- · ., 
Court Costs and Delay of the American Bar Association. our 
·· CQurt is cooperating with the ABA in its implementation. Its 
purpose is to reduce appellate court costs and delays in briefing_ 
and decision.. Our goal is to provide a written decision within 
80-100 days after stipulation of counsel for expedited appeal. 
Its application is limited to cases in which counsel stipulate 
to lts use. 
n.:~_ny briefs filed \7ith the ap!.)elln.te cou.rts are n~cdlessly 
long.. Although there m<.1y b2 only 1 or 2 pivotal issues, attorneys 
often add issues that are not ncccf;sax:y to proper review and 
decision. A needlmctsly Jong opcn:i.ng b•:ief requires a needlessly 
long respondent's brief and necdlc:;sly long staff memo. It results 
in unnecessary work for the judges and staff. Issuance of a stipu-
lated scheduling order limiting thl3 size and time for briefing and 
setting a calendar date will, it is hoped, reduce the time, effort 
and expenses of counsel in preparing briefs i:'.nd at the same time 
reduce delay in resolution of the .. lppeal. The Court intends to 
J:cly n1ore heavily on oral :u:gument (as in the English system) and 
hopes to file its ut~Ir,orandum opinio?- within 10 days after· oral 
argu.h·mt. 
'.l'he Notice to Conasel R.;garding Avaih~.bi.lity of Expedited Appeals 
r?L()C:c:itu:cq, a copy of uhich you indica~·.c you have "~ lrcndy recc.i vcd, 
rlc~rr:.1.::i.b~s the nmr p1:ncNlnre ln 1•1.orc~ de·i ail. Du1:1ng February 1981, 
•:unn~·<'l in 14 r.a!H~s h~;.ve ~:t:ipult:ltcd t.o is~>tF'nce of a :::chcduling Ol:der 
~);_uvi.t15 l1iJ f:o:c c~::pe:c1J.t:<:d bd.et'ing.. The! e c<:'J;es ·oill he h;~ard on 
;~<,:lcnd<\rS .in April l' . nd tliiy 1981. 
'.l~hc !'.nc;:d.c?m B<"r Jl .. s:~oc5.rd:5.on ·l.s 1.11 k5.ng availnble to t:his Conrt 
~nr n G· ·: 'Oa-i·h pe1·iod, n'e ru;~-:is~:; n ~e of a ntaff nt.tnx:·uuy ~ lnployed 
L.y i.t bnt \.·.-,: .. ·J;.J ng <'l•d<"r "i:hc ro.11:t' 'i ; 11~ :::ru·i.fl.i.on. 
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IN AND FOR THE 
0 APPELLATE DISTRICT 
ted Appeal Program 
August 4, 1981 
1. cases cal a to te: 68 
2. 
B. 
c. Dates a nt: 
April 20 July 13, 
May 4, 11, , 20, 21 August 3, 
June 1 22 September 
Opinions fi to . 39 . 
A. Days from stipulation to filing 
Average 71 
Range: 4 6 
B. Leng t (minutes) 
Aver : 27 
ltange: 4 5 
c. oral argument to filing 
6 
D. Fili s 
April 
1 
E. 
F. 
12 
July 
12 
{pages) 
Aug. 
1 
20 
24 
2, 
G. Opinions r ifi for Publication: 6 
B. Cal. rt Action 
Bearing denied: 2 
Bearing gran : 0 
Depublished: 0 
21 
I. Staff calendar memorandum preparation (hours per case) 
Average: 8 
Range: 2.7 24.25 -131-
:a No. 
3* 
7 
0 
602 
237** 
19 
2 63 
19925** 
20283 
0 
19687 
20 92 
0 23 
875 
1 9 8 
0 90 
Insur 
Gov. Tort 
Wr ful 
Real 
Lease 
Es 1 
Gov.Tort 
Gov.Tort 
Defamation 
Cla Sta 
Insurance ( 
tu 
2 043 
20 85 
19996 
20333 
20375** 
20421 
20464 
20512 
20293 
20271 
20507 
Conspi {new 
Conservatorsh 
Sale Contr 
Pers. Inju 
Judgments 
Real Prop 
Insurance 
Bearing deni 
Opin certi 
+ Appellant's 
sti lation. 
++ No appearance 
included in aver 
+++ No appearance 
++++ Both brie fi 
on 
TABLE 1 
i to August 4, 1981 
Length of 
Oral 
Argument 
(minutes) 
42 
35 
41 
29 
23 
23 
27 
44 
31 
6 
50 
9 
25 
29 
75 
15 
21 
46 
56 
22 
27 
++ 
37 
15 
9 
16 
20 
26 
4+++ 
26 
31 
25 
21 
40 
28 
10 
• Supreme Court. 
ication. 
Days from 
Stip. to 
opinion 
filing 
88 
86 
82 
79 
69 
83 
80 
85 
68 
90 
71 
74 
67 
74 
49+ 
77 
96 
63 
59 
84 
84 
64 
53 
76 
63 
70 
63 
60 
92 
49 
68 
49 
48++++ 
70 
78 
52 
54 
87 
61 
Days from 
argument 
to opinion 
filing 
4 
4 
2 
4 
2 
3 
4 
7 
7 
12 
4 
7 
7 
6 
8 
1 
23 
2 
4 
7 
7 
10 
1 
1 
1 
2 
7 
7 
9 
5 
7 
5 
9 
3 
3 
9 
9 
18 
1 
fore settlement conference and 
; respondent waived argument1 not 
t: respondent answered court's question. 
stipulation. 
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475 
5 
455 
4 
4 
5 
80 
CIVIL CASES PENDING 
(Records filed) 
81 
7/28/81 
Expedited Pr ram 
July Sept. Nov. Jan. Mar. May 
Aug. Oct. Dec. Feb. April June 
-133-
IN THE 
<!tnurt nf Apprul nf tqr §tutr nf Q!ulifnrntu 
IN AND FOR THE 
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 
MEMO TO PRESIDING JUSTICE PUGLIA AND ALL ASSOCIATE JUSTICES: 
There has been a dramatic decrease in total civil cases 
pending since implementation of the new "Expedited Appeal Pro-
gram." The following statistics speak for themselves: 
TOTAL CIVIL CASES PENDING 
1980 1981 
J;uly Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan.'" Feb. Mar. Apr. May June 
-
436 431 439 445 446 468 483 480 476 463 436 413 
• 
Dated: July 13, 1981 Wilfried J. Kramer, Clerk 
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- ESTIMATED TIME INTERVALS FOR PROCESSING APPEALS 
(In Days) 
of Appeal 
Use 
for 
ignation of Record 
Designation 
of 
Record 
Appeal) 
Record Costs 
of Estimated Costs 
Sup. Ct. Record Filed 
Track A 
1 
I 
5 
! 
10 
20 
's & Reporter's Record Filed ~ 's Transcript Filed 
Conference Request 30 
.a. 
1 
fi 
') ~ 
' ld 
20 
c. ...0 
1 1 
6.5 
' 
'-
125 
I 
125 
I 
135 
r· 
5 
t 
10 
I 
r 
20 
& 
1 
I 
5 
I 
10 
1 
10 
I 
25 
I 
55 
I 
65 
20 r 
~ 12f 
30 ~ 
Pre-Argument Statement Piled I 
I 
145 40 145 
Statement Review-
of Expedited Appeal 
ity 
Expedited Review 
Conference (30d) 
Negotiations Delay (60d) 
's Memorandum Brief (20d) 
's Memorandum Brief (20d) 
ing Brief (60d) 
tten Opinion 
~ 
60 
45 
5!5 
.. , i; 
r 
120 ** L _,
75 
95 
I 
L ~ 
125 
f 
~ ( 120) 130 
45 
L 
I 
1~5 r 
2lS ** ~ 
-I I I 
r 
' I 
1-
80 
I 
140 
I 
260 
(2l5) 2910 
Record-Settlement Conference (Successful) ** 
- Original Record-~xpedited Appeal 
I 
185 
I 
245 
's & Reporter's Transcript-Settlement Conference (Success 
Record-No Settlement Conference 
Record-Settlement Conference (Unsuccessful)-
& Reporter's Transcript-No Settlement Conference 
0 
s & Reporter's Transcript-Settlement Conference ( ) 
Scheduling order would then be made when 
total timA ·from 1111 ""'"' 1nc; ri"'""" 
June 1, 1981 
Expedited Appeals after 2 months or 1/3 of contract period. 
In the past 8 weeks, 37 cases have been calendared on 
this program. Thirty-five stipulations have come after settlement 
conferences; in three cases counsel stipulated before the 
settlement conference was held. 
As of the end of today, the court will have heard oral 
argument in 21 cases and filed opinions in 15. Only 
will not have met the 5-10 day from oral argument to 
feature of the program; one missed by only one day. 
periods are summarized below: 
two cases 
filing 
Relevant time 
Case No. Subject & Posture of Length of Days from 
Appeal Oral Stip. to 
Argument opinion 
(minutes) filing-
19973 Insurance (demurrer) 42 88 
19917 Gov.Tort Liab. (demurrer) 35 86 
20150 Wrongful death(demurrer) 41 82 
20006 Real Property (trial) 29- 72 
20063 Gov.Tort Liab.(demurrer) 23 69 
1995~ Gov.Tort Liab ... (order) 23. 83 
20364 Workers• Comp.(sum.judg.) 17 80 
20378 Admin. Mandamus (writ) 27 85 
19626 Employ. Contract (trial) 44 68 
19814 Corp. Liquidation(order) 31 89 
19778 Community Prop. (order) 6 71 
19861 Real Prop. (trial) 50 74 
20365 Med. Malpr. (sum. judg.) 19 67 
20242 Insurance (trial) 9 74 
20191 Workers' Comp. (demurrer) 25 49* 
Average 28 76 
* Appellant's brief filed before settlement conference. 
Remaining Calendar Dates Scheduled Thus Far 
June 22 
July 13 
July 20 
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6 cases 
6 cases 
4 cases 
Days from 
argument 
to opinion 
filing 
4 
4 
2 
4 
2 
3 
4 
7 
7 
11 
4 
7 
7 
6 
8 
5 
WRK 
Q!nurt nf :prul 
DISTRICT 
UlltAI!'I' AND COimiS BUilDING 
914 CAPITOl MAll 
SACRAMENTO, '-"'•'""""''''""' 
AREA COOE tl6, ~71 
From examination appellant's pre-argument 
believes that appeal would benefit from our new 
which permits expedited decision based on filing of 
memorandum briefs, limited to 10 pages, exclusive 
statement of facts, followed by prompt oral argument and 
memorandum opinion. Use of the new procedure is dependent 
stipulation of counsel It is appellant's responsibility to 
the necessary stipulation. 
The new procedure should permit resolution of an appeal with-
75-80 days after filing of the stipulation as contrasted with 
the 14-15 months normally required. No extensions of time for brief: 
would be ermitted. Failure by appellant to file his brief 
t e t1me prov1 ed may result in dismissal of the appeal 
further notice. Filing of the memorandum opinion is 
within 5-10 days after oral argument. 
If all counsel stipulate, a scheduling order providing as 
will be entered: 
(a) Filing of appellant's typewritten memo brief: 20 days 
(b) Filing of respondent's ~ypewritten memo brief: 20 days 
) Oral argument: 30 days 
Please confer with opposing counsel and, if you wish to use 
new procedure, return the enclosed stipulation to this 
by 
truly yours, 
WILFRIED J. KRAMER, Clerk 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE 
<t!nurt nf Apprnl nf fl1r &tntr nf Q!nltfnnttn 
IN AND FOR THE 
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 
3 Civil ___ _ 
STIPULATION FOR EXPEDITED APPEAL AND 
ISSUANCE OF SCHEDULING ORDER 
We hereby request that this appeal be considered for 
expedited resolution as described in the court's letter of 
invitation and agree to issuance of a scheduling order 
providing for filing of typewritten memorandum briefs as 
follows: 
(a) Appellant's opening brief within 20 days of order: 
(b) Respondent's brief within 20 days after due date 
of appellant's opening brief. 
'VTe understand that no extensions of time will be granted 
and that our briefs will be limited to 10 pages, not including 
statement of facts, and that the scheduling order will set a 
date for oral argument of approximately 70-90 days from date 
of the scheduling order. 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Respondent 
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JIJSAN WHilUCIE 
D, !IIlJa ICIDENIIIOCK 
your 
The court believes 
new.procedure which permits 
typewritten memorandum 
the statement of facts, 
7 
memorandum 
stipulation of 
the 
new procedure 
0 dazs after 
5 months 
briefing wou!a Se permitted 
within the time provided may 
pprnl 
DISTRICT 
UIIAIY AND couatS ~ 
914 CN'ITOI. MAU 
SA~O. CAI..Ii'OINIA 95114 
lillflf.A c::oDE 916, ~ 
settlement conference 
terminated. You are 
brief is to be served 
would benefit from our 
decision based on filing of 
to 10 pages exclusive of 
prompt oral argument and 
the new procedure is dependent 
appellant's responsibility to 
resolution of an appeal 
stipulation as contrasted 
• No extensions of time for 
Failure-sy-appellant to file his 
t dismissal of the 
further Filing memorandum 
argument. within after 
scheduling order providing as 
of 
Filing of 
Oral argument: 
new procedure, 
office by 
memo 20 
memo brief: 20 
and, if you wish to use 
stipulation to this 
, 
J. 

I { 
implemented to 
those parts of the 
necessary for the 
In 
~"'"I~"m" are and 
than traditional transcrip-
tion, and their use could be ex-
plored. The Commission's rec-
ommendations address both what 
and how. A program 
on those recommendations 
u,~..n.,...,,~ one or both areas, aJ. 
sion of a CAT 
component is not essential to the 
Commission's program and would 
probably depend upon its preex-
isting utilization by court reporters 
in the implementing jurisdiction. 
Many court rules provide for the 
than full trial tran-
agreed statements 
of the record. The issue 
these 
counsel in appro· 
priate cases. A court should con-
shier the adoption of addit!onal 
procedures designed to encourage 
the utilization of transcript alterna-
tives. These can include the estab-
lishment of presumptions in favor 
of agreed statements or in favor of 
peaL 
with sanctions against 
the preparation of 
determined by the 
be unnecessary to the ap-
Emphasis on For~ 
- Court rules shouid be 
providing for the use 
briefs or memoranda 
cases that do not require 
briefing to raise and 
issues involved in the ap-
l'tit underlying the lim-
ited brief is that a oourt does not 
full briefing in certain 
types of cases, e.s., where the is-
sues are simple or routine, invoJv-
weU-settled issues of law 
application to relatively 
Ul'lii:Ornpiicated factual 
33 
are 
which we are in-
having implemented are 
to counsel prior to 
of the issues of interest 
and the circulation of 
or draft opinions. 
\-UUUIII~:I·IUII has been StUd)'· 
adopted practice 
the Superior Court in 
which normally gives 
ruling to attorneys be-
argument. Some form of 
notification could be intro-
a court either as part of a 
package of procedural re-
or as a discrete modifica-
with the expedited appeals 
these features may not 
for all courts or for 
In addition, while 
potential benefits to 
arguments. there may 
be some less obvious effects. 
if the court circu-
a tentative decision or draft 
will counsel seek the op-
to respond through the 
of supplemental briefs? 
CHAPPER is the Deputy 
the Action Commis-
had predousl}" been Spe-
!o !he District of Co-
Counsel and has 
D.C. Superior Court. 
has served on a number 
Bar Association com-
the criminal justice area 
involved in a variety of 
activities relating to the 
the practice of law. She is 
of the Georgetown Uni-
Law Center and Smith Col-
conduct of court business. Tele-
has the paten-
the ultimate cost 
of litigation reducing attorney 
travel and waiting time. Our re-
search indicates that a very wide 
range of court business is now 
conducted telephone. At the 
the telephone is used 
conferences, pretri-
and motion hearings in 
cases. Telephone conferenc-
ing is used less frequently in crim-
inal mauers, but in some courts 
telephone conferencing includes 
taking as wen as conducting 
motion A number of ap-
pellate courts currently use tele-
phone conferencing for motion 
or as an opportunity for a 
a motion submit-
ted on the papers to obtain sup-
court, costs 
appearing in 
court may 
jurisdictions, 
to the court, 
sit in different 
ments. 
PAUL NE/ELSKl. a lecturer 
University of Maryland Law 
has been Staff Director !he 
con Bar Associalion ·s 
mission lo Reduce Court Costs 
Delay since its inception in March 
I 979. Mr. Nejelski is a groduole 
Yale College and Yale Law .... u'Hn..IL 
He has served as a consultanl 
number of organizations, 
the Ford Foundation and the 
dian institute for the Administrofion 
of fustice. 
Dear 
ssociation 
new procedures. 
decision Tegarding 
Some of the questions 
to effect cf the 
and presentation 
review under 
upon 'i&ich the 
Bar ban. 
